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PREFACE
These lecture notes are designed to provide the students majoring in the liberal arts
with an understanding and appreciation of mathematics as a lively, interesting, and
surprisingly rich human activity with many fascinating applications. The text,
emphasizing strongly intuitive thinking and visualization, is a collection of topics
chosen to show the open-minded readers that:
• The connection between the mathematics presented in the course and downto-earth, concrete real-life problems is transparent and immediate.
• Modern mathematical discoveries do not have to be the exclusive province
of professional mathematicians.
• There is an important aesthetic component in mathematics, and just as in art
and music, it often surfaces on the simplest ideas.
The course does not presume a background beyond standard high school
mathematics. And its major goal is to reveal that mathematics can be when looked
at in the right way-useful, beautiful, and accessible.
This work is licensed as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
License CC BY-NC-SA
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1. THE MATHEMATICS OF ELECTIONS

4

We have elections because we don’t all think alike. Since we cannot all have things our way, we
vote. But voting is only the first half of the story, the one we are most familiar with. As
playwright Tom Stoppard suggests, it’s the second half of the story – the counting -that is at the
hearth of the democratic process. But
•
•
•

How do we sift through the many choices of individual voters to find the collective
choice of the group?
How well the process works?
Is the process always fair?

In the late 1940’s the American economist Kenneth Arrow discovered a remarkable fact:
For elections involving three or more candidates, there is no consistently fair democratic
method for choosing the winner.
In fact, Arrow demonstrated that a method for determining election results that is always fair is a
mathematical impossibility. This is what in the voting theory, is known as Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem.
This section starts with a general discussion of elections and ballots. We will explore four of the
most commonly used voting methods. We will also introduce some basic principles of fairness
for voting methods and apply these fairness criteria to the voting methods previously discussed.
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1.1 THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF AN ELECTION
All elections (big or small, important, or trivial) share a common set of elements.

•

The candidates

The purpose of an election is to choose from a set of candidates (used for people) or alternatives
(used for other things). The candidates/alternatives must be at least two – otherwise it is not a real
election.

•

The voters

These are the people who get a say in the outcome of the election. In most democratic elections
the presumption is that all voters have an equal say.

•

The ballots

A ballot is the device by means of which a voter gets to express his/her opinion of the
candidates. The most common type is a paper ballot but voice vote, text message, or phone call
can also serve as a “ballot”.
The simplest form is the single-choice ballot. At the other end of the spectrum is the preference
ballot, where the voter is asked to rank all the candidates in order of preference.

•

The outcome

The purpose of an election is to use the information provided by the ballots to produce some type
of outcome. The most common is winner-only (all the voters want is to find a winner).
In situations where we want a broader outcome than just a winner (say we want to determine the
first-, second- and third- place candidate from a set of many candidates), we call this type of
outcome a partial ranking.
In case we want to rank all the candidates, we call this type of outcome full ranking (or simply
ranking)

•

The voting method

This is the method we use to tabulate the ballots and produce the outcome.
6

EXAMPLE 1.1 The math club election (WINNER-ONLY)
The Math Appreciation Society (MAS) is a student club dedicated to an unsung but worthy
cause: that of fostering the enjoyment and appreciation of mathematics among college students.
The MAS chapter at Tasmania State University is holding its annual election for club president,
and there are four candidates running: Alisha (A), Boris (B), Carmen (C) and Dave (D).
Every member of the club is eligible to vote, and the vote takes the form of a preference ballot.
Each voter is asked to rank each of the four candidates in order of preference. There are 37 voters
who submit their ballots of the type
Ballot
1st C
2nd B
3rd D
4th A

Since the purpose of the election is to choose a club president, the election is winner-only.
The great advantage of preference ballots is that they provide a great del of useful information
about the individual voter’s preferences. For instance, the above ballot directly tells us that the
voter likes candidate C best, B second best, D third best, and A last.
In fact, this ballot tells us a lot more – it tells us which candidate the voter would choose if it
came down to a choice between just two candidates. For example, if it came down to a choice
between, say, A and B, which one the voter choose? Of course, the voter would choose B
because B is above A in the ballot. This, a preference ballot allows us to make relative
comparisons between any two candidates - the candidate higher on the ballot is always
preferred over the candidate in the lower position.
The second important idea is the assumption that the relative preferences in a preference ballot
do not change of one of the candidates for some unforeseen reason drops out of the race right
before the ballots are tabulated. If this is the candidate B. Then the old ballot simply becomes the
ballot
Ballot
1st C
2nd D
3rd A

Each of the candidates above B stay put and each of the candidates below B moves up a spot.
7

In an election with many voters, some voters will vote the same way- for the same candidates in
the same order of preferences. So, if we are going to tabulate the 37 ballots, it might make sense
to put all A-B-C-D ballots in one pile, all C-B-D-A ballots in another pile, and so on. Then to
make the whole idea a little more formal, we can put all the ballot information in a table, called
preference schedule for the election as the following one

Number of voters
1st
2nd
3rd
4th

14
A
B
C
D

10
C
B
D
A

8
D
C
B
A

4
B
D
C
A

1
C
D
B
A

EXAMPLE 1.2 The math club election (FULL RANKING)
Suppose now that we have pretty much the same situation as in EXAMPLE 1.1 (same
candidates, same voters, same preference ballots), but in the election we have to choose not only
a president but also a vice-president, a treasurer, and a secretary. According to the club bylaws,
the president is the candidate who comes in first, the vice-president is the candidate who comes
in second, the treasurer is the candidate who comes in third, and the secretary is the candidate
who comes in fourth. Given that there are four candidates, each candidate will get to be an
officer, but there is a big difference between being elected president and being elected treasurer (
the president gets status and perks; the treasurer gets to collect the dues and balance the budget).
Hoe you place matters, and the outcome should be a full ranking of the candidates.
In any election, be it a winner-only election or a ranking of the candidates, ties can occur.
In some elections (Academy Awards, sports awards, and reality TV competitions) ties are
allowed to stand and need not be broken.
But in elections for political office (president, senator, mayor, city council, etc.) ties cannot be
allowed and then tie-breaking rule must be specified. The Constitution, for example, stipulates
how a tie in the Electoral College is broken. The most common method for breaking a tie for
political office is through a runoff election. But runoff elections are expensive and take time, so
many other tie-breaking procedures are used.
Ties and tie-breaking procedures add another layer of complexity to an already rich
subject. Therefore, in this course we will stay away from ties as much as possible.
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1.2

THE PLURALITY METHOD

The plurality method is arguably the simplest and most used method for determining the
outcome of an election. With the plurality method, all that matters is how many first place votes
each candidate gets.
In a winner-only election the candidate with the most first place votes is the winner.
In a ranked election the candidate with the most first place votes is first, the candidate with the
second most is second, and so on.
For an election decided under the plurality method, preference ballots are not needed, since the
voter’s second, third, etc. choices are not used. But since we already have the preference
schedule in EXAMPLE 1.1 and EXAMPLE 1.2, let’s use it to determine the outcome under the
plurality method.
Let look back to the table in EXAMPLE 1.1, that shows the preference schedule for the election.

Number of voters
1st
2nd
3rd
4th

14
A
B
C
D

10
C
B
D
A

8
D
C
B
A

4
B
D
C
A

1
C
D
B
A

Counting only first place votes, we can see that A gets 14, B gets 4, C gets 11, and D gets 8.
So, in the case of winner-only (EXAMPLE 1.1) election, the winner is A.
(Headline:” Alisha wins presidency of the Math Club).
In the case of a ranked election (EXAMPLE 1.2) the results are: A first (14 votes), C second (11
votes), D third (8 votes), B fourth (4 votes).
(Headline: “New board of MAS elected! President: Alisha; VP: Carmen; Treasurer: Dave;
Secretary: Boris”)

1.3 THE BORDA COUNT METHOD
The second most used method for determining the winner of an election is the Borda
count method, named after the Frenchman Jean-Charles de Borda. In this method each
9

place on a ballot is assigned points. In an election with N candidates we give 1 point for
last place, 2 points for second from last place, and so on. At the top of the ballot, a firstplace vote is worth N points. The points are tallied for each candidate separately, and the
candidate with the highest total is the win- ner. If we are ranking the candidates, the
candidate with the second-most points comes in second, the candidate with the thirdmost points comes in third, and so on. We will start our discussion of the Borda count
method by revisiting the Math Club election
EXAMPLE 1.3 The math club election (BORDA COUNT)

number of voters
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EXAMPLE 1.4

The 2015 Heisman Award

The Heisman is determined using a Borda count, but with truncated preference ballots:
each voter chooses a first, second, and third choice out of a large list of candidates, with a
first-place vote worth 3 points, a second-place vote worth 2 points, and a third-place vote
worth 1 point. Table 7 shows a summary of the results of the 2010 Heisman ballot. The
table shows the number of first-, second-, and third-place votes for each of the four
finalists.

player
Robert
Griffin III
Andrew Luck
Trent
Richardson
Montee Ball
Tyrann
Mathieu

1st
(3pts.)

2nd
(2pts.)

3rd (1
pt.)

40
5
24
7
13
8
22

16
8
25
0
20
7
83

34

63

13
6
16
6
15
0
11
6
99

Total
points
1687
1407
978
348
327

The last column of Table shows the total number of point received by each finalist and
the ranking of the finalists: Robert Griffin III (Baylor) won the Heisman easily, Andrew
Luck (Stanford) was second, Trent Richardson (Alabama) was third, Montee Ball
(Wisconsin) was fourth, and Tyrann Mathieu (LSU) was fifth.
Many variations of the standard Borda count method are possible, the most common
being using a different set of values for the positions on the ballot. We will call these
modified Borda count methods. Example 12 illustrates one situation where a modified
Borda count is used.
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EXAMPLE 1.5

The 2015 National League CY Young Award

Yong Kim/MCT/Newscom

The Cy Young Award is an annual award given by Major
League baseball for “the best pitcher” in each league (one
award for the American League and one for the National
League).
For theNational League award there
are 32 voters (they are baseball writers—two
from each of the 16 cities having a National
League team), and each voter submits a truncated
preference ballot with a first, second, third,
fourth, and fifth choice. The modification in the
Cy Young calculations (in effect for the first time
with the 2010 award) is that first place is worth 7
points (rather than 5). The other places in the
ballot count just as in a regular Borda count: 4
points for second, 3 points for third, 2 points for
fourth, and 1 point for fifth. The idea here is to
give extra value to first-place votes—the gap
between a first and a second place should be
bigger than the gap between a second and a third
place.
piter
Roy Halladay
(PHI)
Adam Wainwright
(STL)
Ubaldo Jimenez
(COL)
Tim Hudson (ATL)
Josh Johnson
(FLA)

1st
(7 pts.)

2nd
(4 pts.)

3rd
(3 pts.)

4th
(2 pts.)

5th
(1 pt.)

Total
points

32

0

0

0

0

224

0

28

3

0

1

122

0

4

19

8

1

90

0
0

0
0

3
5

13
5

4
9

39
34

Source: Baseball-Reference.com, www.baseballreference.com/awards/awards_2010.shtml
2010 National League Cy Young Award: top five finalists
The above Table shows the top five finalists for the 2010 National League Cy Young
award. An unusual thing happened in this election—Roy Halladay (Phillies) was the
unanimous first choice of all 32 voters, thus garnering the maximum possible points (32
* 7 = 224), a very rare event indeed.
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1.4 THE PLURALITY WITH ELIMINATION METHOD
In the United States most municipal and local elections have a majority requirement—a
candidate needs a majority of the votes to get elected. With only two candidates this is rarely a
problem (unless they tie, one of the two candidates must have a majority of the votes). When
there are three or more candidates running, it can easily happen that no candidate has a majority.
Typically, the candidate or candidates with the fewest first-place votes are eliminated, and a
runoff election is held. But runoff elections are expensive, and in these times of tight budgets
more efficient ways to accomplish the “runoff” are highly desirable.
A very efficient way to implement the runoff process without needing runoff elections is to use
preference ballots, since a preference ballot tells us not only which candidate the voter wants to
win but also which candidate the voter would choose in a runoff (with one important caveat—
we assume the voters are consistent in their preferences and would stick with their original
ranking of the candi- dates). The idea is to use the information in the preference schedule to
eliminate the candidates with the fewest first-place votes one at a time until one of them gets a
majority. This method has become increasingly popular and is nowadays known under several
different names, including plurality-with-elimination, instant runoff voting (IRV), ranked choice
voting (RCV), and the Hare method. For the sake of clarity, we will call it the plurality-withelimination method—it is the most descriptive of all the names.
Here is a formal description of the plurality-with-elimination method:
Round 1. Count the first-place votes for each candidate, just as you would in the plurality
method. If a candidate has a majority of first-place votes, then that candidate is the winner.
Otherwise, eliminate the candidate (or candidates if there is a tie) with the fewest first-place
votes.
Round 2. Cross out the name(s) of the candidates eliminated from the preference schedule and
transfer those votes to the next eligible candidates on those ballots. Recount the votes. If a
candidate has a majority then declare that candidate, the winner. Otherwise, eliminate the
candidate with the fewest votes.
Rounds 3, 4, . . . Repeat the process, each time eliminating the candidate with the fewest votes
and transferring those votes to the next eligible candidates. Continue until there is a candidate
with a majority. That candidate is the winner of the election.
In a ranked election the candidates should be ranked in reverse order of elimination: the
candidate eliminated in the last round gets second place, the candidate eliminated in the secondto-last round gets third place, and so on.
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EXAMPLE 1.6 The math club election (PLURALITY WITH ELIMINATION)

number of voters

14

10

8

1st

A

C

D

2nd

B

B

C

3rd

C

D

B

4th

D

A

A

Let’s see how the plurality-withelimination method works when
applied to the Math Club
election. For the reader’s
convenience the Table shows the
preference schedule again.

Round 1
Candidates

A

B

C

D

Votes

14

4

11

8

B has the fewest first-place votes and is eliminated first.

Round 2: After B is eliminated, the four votes originally given for B are transferred to
D.
Candidates

A

C

D

Votes

14

11

12

In this round C has the fewest first-place votes and is eliminated.

Round 3: The 11 votes that went to C in Round 2 are all transferred to D. The new tally
is
Candidates

A

D

Votes

14

23

The winner is D! For a ranked election we have D first, A second (eliminated in Round
3), C third (eliminated in Round 2), and B last (eliminated in Round 1).

1.5

THE METHOD OF PAIRWISE COMPARISON

One of the most useful features of a preference schedule is that it allows us to find the winner of
any pairwise comparison between candidates. Specifically, given any two candidates—call
them X and Y—we can count how many voters rank X above Y and how many rank Y above X.
14

The one with the most votes wins the pairwise comparison. This is the basis for a method called
the method of pairwise comparisons (sometimes also called Copeland’s method). For each
possible pairwise comparison between candidates, give 1 point to the winner, 0 points to the
loser (if the pairwise comparison ends up in a tie give each candidate 1 point). The candidate
with the most points is the winner. (If we are ranking the candidates, the candidate with the
second- most points is second, and so on.) The method of pairwise comparisons is very much
like a round-robin tournament: (1) every player plays every other player once; (2) the winner of
each “match” gets a point and the loser gets no points (if there is a tie each gets 1 point); and (3)
the player with the most points wins the tournament.
Let us consider again the Math Club election example (EXAMPLE 1.1).
EXAMPLE 1.7

number of voters

14

10

8

4

1

1st

A

C

D

B

C

2nd

B

B

C

D

D

3rd

C

D

B

C

B

4th

D

A

A

A

A

The table shows, once again, the
preference schedule for the Math
Club
election.
With
four
candidates, there are six possible
pairwise
comparisons
to
consider: (1) A v B, (2) A v C, (3)
A v D, (4) B v C, (5) B v D,
and (6) C v D. We’ll look at (1) A
v B and (6) C v D
and leave the details of the other
four to the reader.
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n

pairwise comparison

votes

Winner

(1) A v B

A (14); B (23)

B

(2) A v C

A (14); C (23)

C

(3) A v D

A (14); D (23)

D

(4) B v C

B (18); C (19)

C

(5) B v D

B (28); D (9)

B

(6) C v D

C (25); D (12)

C

n

A v B: The first column of Table 12 represents 14
votes for A (A is ranked higher than B); the remaining 23 votes are for B (B is ranked higher than A in
the last four columns of the table). The winner of
this comparison is B.
C v D: The first, second, and last columns of Table
12 represent votes for C (C is ranked higher than
D); the third and fourth columns represent votes for
D (D is ranked higher than C). Thus, C has 25 votes
to D’s 12 votes. The winner of this comparison is C.

We continue this way, checking the results of all
six possible comparisons (try it now on your own,
before you read on!). Once you are done, you should
n Table 13 Pairwise comparisons for the Math Club election
get something along the lines of Table 13 with a summary of the results (a sort of scoreboard, if you will.)
From Table 13 one can immediately figure out the outcome of the election: In a
winner-only election the winner is C (with 3 points); in a ranked election C is first
(3 points), B second (2 points), D third (1 point), and A fourth (no points).
Total points: C = 3, B = 2, D = 1, A = 0

ranking
method

Winner only

1st 2nd 3rd

4th

Plurality

A

A

C

D

B

Borda count

B

B

C

D

A

Plurality with elimination

D

D

A

C

B

Pairwise comparisons

C

C

B

D

A

n Table 14 The outcome of the Math Club election under four
different voting methods

If you have been paying close attention, you
may have noticed that the results of the Math
Club election have been different under each of
the voting methods we have discussed—both in
terms of the winner and in terms of the ranking
of the candidates. This can be seen quite clearly
in the summary results shown in Table 14. It is
amazing how much the outcome of an election
can depend on the voting method used!
One more important comment about Example 17: Notice that C was the undefeated
champion, as C won each of the pairwise comparisons against the other candidates. (We

already saw that there is a name for a candidate that beats all the other candidates
in pairwise comparisons—we call such a candidate a Condorcet candidate.) The
method of pairwise comparisons always chooses the Condorcet candidate (when
there is one) as the winner of the election, but this is not true with all methods.
Under the plurality method, for example, you can have a Condorcet candidate
that does not win the election (see Example 9).
Although the method of pairwise comparisons is a pretty good method,
in real-life elections it is not used as much as the other three methods we
discussed. In the next example we will illustrate one interesting and
meaningful (if you are a football fan) application of the method—the
selection of draft choices in the National Football League. Because NFL
teams are extremely secretive about how they make their draft decisions, we
will illustrate the general idea with a made-up example.
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1.6 FAIRNESS CRITERIA AND ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM

Yan Sheng/Newscom

So far, this is what we learned: There are many different types of elections and there are
different ways to decide their outcome. We examined four different voting methods in some
detail, but there are many others that we do not have time to discuss (a few are mentioned in the
exercises). So now comes a different but fundamental question (that may have already crossed
your mind):

Of all those voting methods out there, which one is the best? As
simple as it sounds, this question has vexed social scientists and
mathematicians for centuries, going back to Condorcet and Borda
in the mid 1700s. For multi-candidate elections (three or more
candidates) there is no good answer. In fact, we now know that
there are limitations to all voting methods. This is a very
important and famous discovery known as Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem. In this section we will discuss the basic ideas behind this
theorem.
In the late 1940s the American economist Kenneth Arrow
turned the question of finding an ideal voting method on its head
and asked himself the following: What would it take for a voting
method to at least be a fair voting method? To answer this question
Arrow set forth a minimum set of requirements that we will call Arrow’s fairness criteria. (In all fairness, Arrow’s original formulation
was quite a bit more complicated than the one we present here. The

Kenneth J. Arrow (1921– )

The majority criterion. A majority candidate (i.e., a candidate with a majority of the first place
votes) should always be the winner.
The Condorcet criterion. A Condorcet candidate (i.e., a candidate that beats each of the other
candidates in a pairwise comparison) should always be the winner.
The monotonicity criterion. If candidate X is the winner, then X would still be the winner had
a voter ranked X higher in his preference ballot. (In other words, a voter should not be able to
hurt the winner by moving him up in his ballot.)
The independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives (IIA) criterion. If candidate X is the winner,
then X would still be the winner had one or more of the irrelevant alternatives (i.e., losing
candidates) not been in the race. (In other words, the winner should not be hurt by the
elimination from the election of irrelevant alternatives.)
The above fairness criteria represent some (not necessarily all) of the basic principles we expect
a democratic election to satisfy and can be used as a benchmark by which we can measure any
voting method. If a method violates any one of these criteria, then there is the potential for
unfair results under that method
17

The next example illustrates how violations of the different fairness criteria might occur.
EXAMPLE 1.8 The Borda Count violates the majority criterion

number of voters
1st
2nd
3rd
4th

6
A
B
C
D

2
B
C
D
A

3
C
D
B
A

The above table shows the preference schedule for a small election. The majority candidate
in this election is A with 6 out of 11 first-place votes, but the winner under the Borda count
method is B (32 points to A’s 29 points).
Essentially what happened in Example 1.8 is that although a majority of the voters had A as
their first choice there were also many voters that had A as their last choice (voters either
loved A or hated A). Candidate B, on the other hand, was more of a compromise
candidate—few first-place votes but enough second- and third- place votes to make a
difference and beat A. It is not hard to see how similar viola- tions of the majority criterion
might often happen under the Borda count method.
The point of the EXAMPLE 1.8 is to illustrate the fact that each of the voting methods
we studied so far may violate one of Arrow’s fairness criteria. In fact, some of the
voting methods violate more than one criterion.

In one sense, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is a bit of a downer. It tells us
that no matter how hard we try democracy will never have a perfectly fair
voting method and that the potential for unfairness is built into every election.
This does not mean that every election is unfair or that every voting method is
equally bad, nor does it mean that we should stop trying to improve the quality
of our voting experience.
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CONCLUSION
“The search of the great minds of recorded history for the perfect democracy, it turns out, is
the search for a chimera, a logical self-contradiction.”
Paul Samuelson
Elections are the mechanism that allows us to make social decisions in a democracy. (In contrast
to a dictatorship, where social decisions are made by one individual and elections are either
meaningless or nonexistent.)
In this Section 1, by the examples included, we discussed important concepts, voting methods,
and fairness criteria.
Beyond the specific concepts and skills, there were several important general themes:
Elections are ubiquitous. The general public tends to think of elections mostly in terms of
political decisions (president, governor, mayor, city council, etc.), but elections are behind
almost every meaningful social decision made outside the political arena—Academy Awards,
American Idol, Heisman Trophy, MVP awards, Homecoming Queen, where to go to dinner, etc.
There are many different voting methods. The outcome of an election can be determined in
many different ways. In this section we discussed in some detail only four methods: plurality,
Borda count, plurality-with-elimination, and pairwise comparisons. But there are many other
voting methods, some quite elaborate and exotic.
Different voting methods can produce different outcomes. We saw an extreme illustration of
this with the Math Club election: each of the four voting methods produced a different winner.
Since there were four candidates, we can say that each of them won the election (just pick the
“right” voting method). Of course, this doesn’t happen all the time and there are many situations
where different voting methods produce the same outcome.
Fairness in voting is elusive. For a voting method to be considered fair there are certain basic
criteria that it should consistently satisfy. These are called fairness criteria. We introduced four
in this chapter (majority, Condorcet, monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant
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alternatives), but there are also others. Each fairness criterion represents a basic principle we
expect a democratic election to satisfy. When a voting method violates any one of these criteria
then there is the potential for unfair results under that method. All of the voting methods we
discussed violate at least one (sometimes several) of the criteria, and there is a good reason why:
For elections with three or more candidates it is mathematically impossible for any for any
voting method to satisfy all four fairness criteria. (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem).

But one should not interpret Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem to
mean that democracy is bad and that elections are pointless. The
lesson to be learned from Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is that no
voting system is perfect because there are some built-in limitations
to the process of making decisions in a democracy. This knowledge
was made possible through the power of mathematical ideas.
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EXERCISES
Ballots and Preference Schedules
1. Figure 8 shows the preference ballots for an election with 21 voters and 5 candidates.
Write out the preference schedule for this election.
Ballot
1st C
2nd E
3rd D
4th A
5th B

Ballot
1st A
2nd D
3rd B
4th C
5th E

Ballot
1st B
2nd E
3rd A
4th C
5th D

Ballot
1st A
2nd B
3rd C
4th D
5th E

Ballot
1st C
2nd E
3rd D
4th A
5th B

Ballot
1st D
2nd C
3rd B
4th E
5th A

Ballot
1st A
2nd B
3rd C
4th D
5th E

Ballot
1st B
2nd E
3rd A
4th C
5th D

Ballot
1st A
2nd B
3rd C
4th D
5th E

Ballot
1st D
2nd C
3rd B
4th A
5th E

Ballot
1st D
2nd C
3rd B
4th E
5th A

Ballot
1st A
2nd B
3rd C
4th D
5th E

Ballot
1st C
2nd E
3rd D
4th A
5th B

Ballot
1st A
2nd D
3rd B
4th C
5th E

Ballot
1st B
2nd E
3rd A
4th C
5th D

Ballot
1st C
2nd E
3rd D
4th A
5th B

Ballot
1st A
2nd B
3rd C
4th D
5th E

Ballot
1st C
2nd E
3rd D
4th A
5th B

Ballot
1st A
2nd D
3rd B
4th C
5th E

Ballot
1st D
2nd C
3rd B
4th A
5th E

Ballot
1st D
2nd C
3rd B
4th E
5th A

2. The table below shows the preference schedule for an election based on the
alternative format for the preference ballots. Rewrite the table in the conventional
preference schedule format used in the text. (Use A, B, C, D, and E as shorthand for
the names of the candidates.)

number of voters

37

36

24

13

5

Alvarez

3

1

2

4

3

Brownstein

1

2

1

2

5

Clarkson

4

4

5

3

1

Dax

5

3

3

5

4

Easton

2

5

4

1

2

3. An election is held to choose the Chair of the Mathematics Department at Tasmania
State University. The candidates are Professors Argand, Brandt, Chavez, Dietz,
and Epstein (A, B, C, D, and E for short). Table 29 shows the preference schedule for
the election
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number of voters

5

5

3

3

3

2

1st

A

C

A

B

D

D

2nd

B

E

D

E

C

C

3rd

C

D

B

A

B

B

4th

D

A

C

C

E

A

5th

E

B

E

D

A

E

(a)

How many people voted in this election?

(b)

How many first-place votes are needed for a majority?

(c)

Which candidate had the fewest last-place votes?

4. The Demublican Party is holding its annual convention. The 1500 voting delegates are
choosing among three possible party platforms: L (a liberal platform), C (a conservative
platform), and M (a moderate platform). Seventeen percent of the delegates prefer L to M
and M to C. Thirty- two percent of the delegates like C the most and L the least. The rest of
the delegates like M the most and C the least. Write out the preference schedule for this
election.
5. The Epicurean Society is holding its annual election for president. The three candidates are
A, B, and C. Twenty percent of the voters like A the most and B the least. Forty percent of
the voters like B the most and A the least. Of the remaining voters 225 prefer C to B and B
to A, and 675 prefer C to A and A to B. Write out the preference schedule for this election.

The Plurality Method
6. The table below shows the preference schedule for an election with four candidates
(A, B, C, and D). Use the plurality method to
(a)

find the winner of the election.

(b)

find the complete ranking of the candidates.
number of voters

27 15 11

9

8

1

1st

C

A

B

D

B

B

2nd

D

B

D

A

A

A

3rd

B

D

A

B

C

D

4th

A

C

C

C

D

C
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7. The table below shows the preference schedule for an election with four candidates
(A, B, C, and D). Use the plurality method to
(d)

find the winner of the election.

(e)

find the complete ranking of the candidates.

number of voters

29

21

18

10

1

1st

D

A

B

C

C

2nd

C

C

A

B

B

3rd

A

B

C

A

D

4th

B

D

D

D

A

8. The table below shows the preference schedule for an election with four candidates
(A, B, C, and D). Use the plurality method to
(a)

find the winner of the election.

(b)

find the complete ranking of the candidates.
number of voters

6

5

4

2

2

2

2

1st

C

A

B

B

C

C

C

2nd

D

D

D

A

B

B

D

3rd

A

C

C

C

A

D

B

4th

B

B

A

D

D

A

A

The Borda Count Method
9. The table below (see Exercise 6) shows the preference schedule for an election with
four candidates (A, B, C, and D). Use the Borda count method to
(a)

find the winner of the election.

(b)

find the complete ranking of the candidates.
number of voters

27 15 11

9

8

1

1st

C

A

B

D

B

B

2nd

D

B

D

A

A

A

3rd

B

D

A

B

C

D

4th

A

C

C

C

D

C
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10. The table below shows the preference schedule for an election with four
candidates (A, B, C, and D). Use the Borda count method to
(a)

find the winner of the election.

(b)

find the complete ranking of the candidates.
number of voters

6

6

5

4

3

3

1st

A

B

B

D

A

B

2nd

C

C

C

A

C

A

3rd

D

A

D

C

D

C

4th

B

D

A

B

B

D

11. The table below shows the top 5 finalists for the 2011 National League Cy
Young Award. Find the ranking of the top 5 finalists and the number of points
each one received.
pitcher

1st

Roy Halladay (PHI)

4

21

Cole Hamels (PHI)

0

Ian Kennedy (AZ)
Clayton Kershaw (LA)
Cliff Lee (PHI)

2nd 3rd

4th

5th

7

0

0

0

0

2

13

1

3

6

18

3

27

3

2

0

0

0

5

17

9

1

The Plurality with Elimination Method
12. The table in Exercise 6 shows the preference schedule for an election with four
candidates (A, B, C, and D). Use the plurality-with-elimination method to
(a)

find the winner of the election.

(b)

find the complete ranking of the candidates.

13. The table in Exercise 7 shows the preference schedule for an election with four
candidates (A, B, C, and D). Use the plurality-with-elimination method to
(a)

find the winner of the election.

(b)

find the complete ranking of the candidates.

14. The table in Exercise 8 shows the preference schedule for an election with four
candidates (A, B, C, and D). Use the plurality-with-elimination method to
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(a)

find the winner of the election.

(b)

find the complete ranking of the candidates.

15. The table below shows the preference schedule for an election with four
candidates (A, B, C, and D). Use the plurality-with-elimination method to
(a)

find the winner of the election.

(b)

find the complete ranking of the candidates.
number of voters

6

6

5

4

3

3

1st

A

B

B

D

A

B

2nd

C

C

C

A

C

A

3rd

D

A

D

C

D

C

4th

B

D

A

B

B

D

The Method of Pairwise Comparison
16. The table in Exercise 6 shows the preference schedule for an election with four
candidates (A, B, C, and D). Use the method of pairwise comparisons to
(a)
(b)

find the winner of the election.
find the complete ranking of the candidates

17. The table in Exercise 7 shows the preference schedule for an election with four
candidates (A, B, C, and D). Use the method of pairwise comparisons to
(a)

find the winner of the election.

(b)

find the complete ranking of the candidates.

18. The table 33 in Exercise 8 shows the preference schedule for an election with
four candidates (A, B, C, and D). Use the method of pairwise comparisons to
(a)

find the winner of the election.

(b)

find the complete ranking of the candidates.

19. The table below shows the preference schedule for an election with five
candidates (A, B, C, D, and E). The number of voters in this election was very large,
so the columns of the preference schedule give the percent of voters instead of the
number of voters. Find the winner of the election using the method of pairwise
comparisons
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percent of voters

24 23 19 14 11

9

1st

C

D

D

B

A

D

2nd

A

A

A

C

C

C

3rd

B

C

E

A

B

A

4th

E

B

C

D

E

E

5th

D

E

B

E

D

B

Fairness Criteria
20. Use Table 41 to illustrate why the Borda count method violates the Condorcet
criterion.
number of voters

6

2

3

1st

A

B

C

2nd

B

C

D

3rd

C

D

B

4th

D

A

A

21. Use the table below to illustrate why the plurality method violates the IIA criterion.
(Hint: Find the winner, then eliminate F and see what happens.)
number of voters

49

48

3

1st

R

H

F

2nd

H

S

H

3rd

F

O

S

4th

O

F

O

5th

S

R

R

22. Use the table below to illustrate why the plurality-with-elimination method
violates the IIA criterion. (Hint: Find the winner, then eliminate C and see what
happens.)
number of voters

5

5

3

3

3

2

1st

A

C

A

D

B

D

2nd

B

E

D

C

E

C

3rd

C

D

B

B

A

B

4th

D

B

C

E

C

A

5th

E

A

E

A

D

E
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ANSWERS
Ballots and Preference Schedules
1. (a) Number of voters
1st choice
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
2.

5

3

5

3

2

3

A
B
C
D
E

A
D
B
C
E

C
E
D
A
B

D
C
B
E
A

D
C
B
A
E

B
E
A
C
D

37

36

24

13

5

3. (a) 21

B
E
A
C
D

A
B
D
C
E

B
A
D
E
C

E
B
C
A
D

C
E
A
D
B

4. Number of voters
1st
2nd
3rd

1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th

(b) 11

(c) C
255
L
M
C

480
C
M
L

765
M
L
C

The Plurality Method
6. (a) C

(b) C, B, A, D

8. (a) C

(b) C, B, A, D

The Plurality with Elimination Method
12. (a) A

(b) A, C, B, D

14. (a) C

(b) C, B, A, D

The Method of Pairwise Comparison
16. (a) D (b) D, B, A, C
18. (a) C

(b) C, D, A, B

Fairness Criteria
20. The winner under the Borda count method is B; the Condorcet candidate is A.
21. The winner under plurality is R; when F is eliminated H becomes the winner.
22. The winner under plurality-with-elimination is A; when C is elimi- nated E becomes the winner.
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1.7 WEIGHED VOTING

“Each State shall appoint a Number of Electors equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the state may be entitled in the Congress.”
Article II, Section 1, U.S. Constitution
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In a diverse society, voters—be they individuals or institutions—are some- times not equal,
and sometimes it is desirable to recognize their differences by giving them different
amounts of say over the outcome of the voting. This is the exact opposite of the principle of
one voter–one
vote, a principle best described as one voter–x votes and formally called weighted voting.

I

Weighted voting is not uncommon—we see examples of weighted voting in shareholder
votes in corporations, in business partnerships, in legislatures, in the United Nations
Security Council, and in the Electoral College.
The Electoral College, that uniquely American institution used to elect the President of the
United States, offers a classic illustration of weighted voting. The Electoral College
consists of 51 “voters” (each of the 50 states plus the District of Columbia), each with a
weight determined by the size of its Congressional delegation (number of Representatives
and Senators). At one end of the spectrum is heavy- weight California (55 electoral votes);
at the other end of the spectrum are small states (in population) like Wyoming, Montana,
North Dakota, and the District of Columbia (3 electoral votes).
We will use the term weighted voting system to describe any formal voting arrangement in
which voters are not necessarily equal in terms of the number of votes they control.
In this section we will only consider voting on yes–no votes, known as motions. Note that
any vote between two choices (say A or B) can be rephrased as a yes–no vote (a Yes is a
vote for A, a No is a vote for B).
Every weighted voting system is characterized by three elements:
The players. We will refer to the voters in a weighted voting system as the players. The
players may be individuals, but they may also be institutions (corporations, governmental
agencies, states, municipalities, or countries). We will use N to denote the number of
players in a weighted voting system, and typically (unless there is a good reason not to) we
will call the players P1, P2, c, PN. (Think of P1 as short for “player 1,” P2 as short for
“player 2,” etc.)
The weights. The hallmark of a weighted voting system is that each player controls a
certain number of votes, called the weight of the player. We will assume that the weights
are all positive integers, and we will use w1, w2,…, wN to denote the weights of P1, P2, c,
PN, respectively. We will use V to denote the total number of votes in the system
(V = w1 + w2 + …+ wN). A weighted voting system is only interesting when the weights
are not all the same, but in principle we do not preclude the possibility that the weights are
all equal.
The quota. In addition to the players’ weights, every weighted voting system has a quota.
The quota is the minimum number of votes required to pass a motion, and is denoted by
the letter q. While the most common standard for the quota is a simple majority of the
votes, the quota may very well be something else. In the U.S. Senate, for example, it takes
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a simple majority to pass an ordinary law, but it takes a minimum of 60 votes to stop a
filibuster, and it takes a minimum of two-thirds of the votes to override a presidential veto.
In other weighted voting systems the rules may stipulate a quota of three-fourths of the
votes, or four- fifths, or even unanimity (100% of the votes).
The standard notation used to describe a weighted voting system is to use square brackets
and inside the square brackets to write the quota q first (followed by a colon) and then the
respective weights of the individual players separated by commas. It is convenient and
customary to list the weights in numerical order, starting with the highest.
Thus, a generic weighted voting system with N players can be written as:
[q: w1, w2, …, wN]

(with w1 > w2 >…> wN)

EXAMPLE 1.7.1 Venture Capitalism
Four partners (P1, P2, P3, and P4) decide to start a new business venture. In order to raise
the $200,000 venture capital needed for startup money, they issue 20 shares worth $10,000
each. Suppose that P1 buys 8 shares, P2 buys 7 shares, P3 buys 3 shares, and P4 buys 2
shares, with the usual agreement that one share equals one vote in the partnership. Suppose
that the quota is set to be two-thirds of the total number of vote
Since the total number of votes in the partnership is V = 20, and two-thirds of 20 is 131/3,
the actual quota is q = 14. Using the weighted voting system notation, we just introduced,
the partnership can be described mathematically as [14: 8, 7, 3, 2].
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EXAMPLE 1.7.2 Anarchy
Imagine the same partnership discussed in Example 2.1, with the only difference being that
the quota is changed to 10 votes. We might be tempted to think of this partnership as the
weighted voting system [10: 8, 7, 3, 2] , but there is a problem here: the quota is too small,
making it possible for both Yes’s and No’s to have enough votes to carry a particular
motion. (Imagine, for example, that an important decision needs to be made and P1 and P4
vote yes and P2 and P3 vote no. Now we have a stalemate since both the Yes’s and the No’s
have enough votes to meet the quota.)
In general, when the quota requirement is less than simple majority, we have the potential
for both Yes’s and No’s to win—a mathematical version of anarchy.
Given that we expect our weighted voting systems to operate without anarchy, from here
on we will assume that the quota will always fall somewhere between simple majority (half
the total number of votes) and the total number of votes. Symbolically,

V
< q ≤ V (where V = w1 +w2 + …+ wN)
2
EXAMPLE 1.7.3 Few Votes, Much Power
Let’s consider the partnership introduced in Example 2.1 one final time. This time the
quota is set to be q = 19. Here we can describe the partnership as the weighted voting
system [19: 8, 7, 3, 2]. What’s interesting about this weighted voting system is that the
only way a motion can pass is by the unanimous support of all the players. (Note that P1,
P2, and P3 together have 18 votes—they still need P4’s votes to pass a motion.) In this
weighted voting system, all four players have the same power. Even though P4 has only 2
votes, his ability to influence the outcome of the vote is the same as that of P1, with 8 votes.
In a practical sense this weighted voting system is no different from a weighted voting
system in which each partner has just one vote and it takes the unanimous agreement of
the four partners to pass a motion (i.e., [4: 1, 1, 1, 1] ).
EXAMPLE 1.7.4 Many Votes, Little Power
Four college friends (P1, P2, P3, and P4) decide to go into business together. Three of the
four (P1, P2, and P3) invest $10,000 each, and each gets 10 shares in the partnership. The
fourth partner (P4) is a little short on cash, so he invests only $9,000 and gets 9 shares. As
usual, one share equals one vote. The quota is set at 75%, which here means q = 30 out of a
total of V = 39 votes. Mathematically (i.e., stripped of all the irrelevant details of the story),
this partnership is just the weighted voting system [30: 10, 10, 10, 9].
Everything seems fine with the partnership until one day P4 wakes up to the realization that
with the quota set at q = 30 he is completely out of the decision- making loop: For a motion
to pass P1, P2, and P3 all must vote Yes, and at that point it makes no difference how P4
votes. Thus, there is never going to be a time when P4’s votes are going to make a
difference in the outcome of a business decision.
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EXAMPLE 1.7.5 Dictators
Consider the weighted voting system [11: 12, 5, 4] . Here one of the players (P1) owns
enough votes to carry a motion singlehandedly. In this situation P1 is in complete control—
if P1 is for the motion, then the motion will pass; if P1 is against it, then the motion will
fail. Clearly, in terms of the power to influence decisions, P1 has all of it. Not surprisingly,
we will say that P1 is a dictator.
Dictator. A player is a dictator if and only if the player’s weight is bigger than or equal to
the quota. Since there can only be one dictator, and since the player with the highest weight
is P1, we can conclude that if there is a dictator, then it must be P1. Mathematically
speaking, a weighted voting system with a dictator is not very interesting, since all the
power is concentrated in the hands of one player.
EXAMPLE 1.7.6 Veto Power
Consider the weighted voting system [12: 9, 5, 4, 2] . Here P1 plays the role of a
“spoiler”—without the support of P1 a motion can’t pass. This happens because if we
remove P1’s 9 votes the sum of the remaining votes (5 + 4 + 2 = 11) is less than the quota q
= 12. Thus, even if all the other players voted Yes, without P1 the motion would not pass.
In a situation like this we say that P1 has veto power.
In general we will say that a player who is not a dictator has veto power if a motion cannot
pass unless the player votes in favor of the motion. In other words, a player with veto
power cannot force a motion to pass (the player is not a dictator) but can force a motion to
fail. If we let w denote the weight of a player with veto power, then the two conditions can
be expressed mathematically by the inequalities w < q (the player is not a dictator) and V w < q (the remaining votes in the system are not enough to pass a motion).
Veto power. A player with weight w has veto power if and only if w < q and
V - w < q (where V = w1 + w2 + g+ wN).
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EXERCISES
1. Nassau County Board of Supervisors (1990). The table below shows the six
districts in Nassau County and their votes in the County Board of Supervisors in
1990. Suppose the quota was set at 60% or more of the votes. Describe this
weighted voting system using the standard notation [q: w1, w2, …, wN ]
district

weight

Hempstead #1

30

Hempstead #2

28

Oyster Bay

22

North Hempstead

21

Long Beach

2

Glen Cove

2

2. The European Union Council (2010). The table below shows the weights of the
member nations in the European Union Council of Ministers in 2010. Suppose
the quota is set at 74% or more of the votes.
a. Find the value of N (the number of players in this weighted voting
system).
b. Find the value of V (the total number of votes in the system).
c. Describe this weighted voting system using the standard notation [q: w1,
w2, …, wN ].
member nation

weight

France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom

29

Spain, Poland

27

Romania

14

Netherlands

13

Belgium, Greece, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Portugal

12

Austria, Bulgaria, Sweden

10

Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Finland

7

Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Slovenia

4

Malta

3
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3. Consider the weighted voting system [q: 6, 4, 3, 3, 2, 2].
a. What is the smallest value that the quota q can take?
b. What is the largest value that the quota q can take?
c. What is the value of the quota if at least three-fourths of the votes are required to
pass a motion?
d. What is the value of the quota if more than three- fourths of the votes are
required to pass a motion?
4. Consider the weighted voting system [q: 10, 6, 5, 4, 2].
a. What is the smallest value that the quota q can take?
b. What is the largest value that the quota q can take?
c. What is the value of the quota if at least two-thirds of the votes are required to
pass a motion?
d. What is the value of the quota if more than two- thirds of the votes are required
to pass a motion?
5. In each of the following weighted voting systems, determine which players, if
any, have veto power.
(a) [7: 4, 3, 3, 2]
(b) [9: 4, 3, 3, 2]
(c) [10: 4, 3, 3, 2]
(d) [11: 4, 3, 3, 2]
6. In each of the following weighted voting systems, deter- mine which players, if
any, have veto power.
(a) [9: 8, 4, 2, 1]
(b) [12: 8, 4, 2, 1]
(c) [14: 8, 4, 2, 1]
(d) [15: 8, 4, 2, 1]
7. Consider the weighted voting system [q: 7, 5, 3] . Find the smallest value of q for
which
a. all three players have veto power.
b. P2 has veto power but P3 does not.
8. Consider the weighted voting system [q: 10, 8, 6, 4, 2].
Find the smallest value of q for which
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a. all five players have veto power.
b.

P3 has veto power but P4 does not.

9. A committee has four members (P1, P2, P3, and P4). In this committee P1 has
twice as many votes as P2; P2 has twice as many votes as P3; P3 and P4 have the
same number of votes. The quota is q = 49. For each of the given definitions of
the quota, describe the committee using the notation [q: w1, w2, w3, w4]. (Hint:
Write the weighted voting system as [49: 4x, 2x, x, x], and then solve for x.)
a. The quota is defined as a simple majority of the votes.
b. The quota is defined as more than two-thirds of the votes.
c. The quota is defined as more than three-fourths of the votes.
10. A committee has six members 1P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P62. In this committee P1 has
twice as many votes as P2; P2 and P3 each has twice as many votes as P4; P4 has
twice as many votes as P5; P5 and P6 have the same number of votes. The quota is q =
121. For each of the given defini- tions of the quota, describe the committee using the
notation 3q: w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w 6 4. (Hint: Write the weighted voting system as 3121:
8x, 4x, 4x, 2x, x, x 4, and then solve for x.)
a. The quota is defined as a simple majority of the votes.
b. The quota is defined as more than two-thirds of the votes.
c.

The quota is defined as more than three-fourths of the votes.

35

ANSWERS
1.

[63: 30, 28, 22, 21, 2, 2]

3. (a) 11

(b) 20 (c) 15

5. (a) None

(b) P1 (c) P1, P2, P3 (d) P1, P2, P3, P4

7. ( a) 13

(d) 16

(b) 11

9. (a) 349: 48, 24, 12, 124 (b) 349: 36, 18, 9, 94
(c) 349: 32, 16, 8, 84
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2 FAIR DIVISION

“I’m happy with the assets I ended up with, and my guess is that they [the brothers] are happy
also. Assets have different values to different people. There is no such thing as a fair market
value; it’s a fair market value in the mind of each person”
– Henry Elghanayan
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The problem of dividing a real estate empire worth $3 billion and the problem of
dividing a stash of Halloween candy are not all that different. Other than the stakes
involved they share the same basic elements: a set of assets, a group of individuals that
have some equity in the assets, and a shared goal of dividing the assets in a fair way.
These types of problems are part of an interesting and important class of problems
known as fair-division problems.
Fairness is an innate human value, based on empathy, the instinct for cooperation,
and, to some extent, self-interest. A theory for sharing things fairly based on
cooperation, reason, and logic is one of the great achievements of social science, and,
once again, we can trace the roots of this achievement to a branch of mathematics
known as game theory.

2.1

Fair-Division Games

(A)The underlying elements of every fair-division game are as follows:
The assets. This is the formal name we will give to the “goodies” being divided. Typically, the
assets are tangible physical objects such as real estate, jewelry, art, candy, cake, and so on. In
some situations the assets being divided may be intangible things such as rights—water rights,
drilling rights, broadcast licenses, and so on. Regardless of the nature of the assets, we will use
the symbol S throughout this section to denote the set of all assets being divided.
The players. In every fair-division game there is a set of parties with the right (or in some
cases the duty) to divide among themselves a set of jointly owned assets. They are the players in
the game. Most of the time the players in a fair-division game are individuals, but it is worth
noting that some of the most significant applications of fair division occur when the players are
institutions (ethnic groups, political parties, states, and even nations).
The value systems. The fundamental assumption we will make is that each player has the
ability to give a value to any part of the assets. Specifically, this means that each player can look
at the set S or any subset of S and assign to it a value—either in absolute terms (“to me, that plot
of land is worth $875,000”) or in relative terms (“to me, that plot of land is worth 30% of the
total value of all assets”).
A fair-division method. These are the rules that govern the way the game is played. Fairdivision methods are very specific and leave no room for ambiguity.
(B) Like most games, fair-division games are predicated on certain assumptions about the
players, as:
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Rationality. Each of the players is a thinking, rational entity seeking to maximize his or her
share of the assets. We will further assume that in the pursuit of this goal, a player’s moves are
based on reason alone (we are taking emotion, psychology, mind games, and all other
nonrational elements out of the picture).
Cooperation. The players are willing participants and accept the rules of the game as binding.
The rules are such that after a finite number of moves by the players, the game terminates with a
division of the assets. (There are no outsiders such as judges or referees involved in these
games—just the players and the rules.)
Privacy. Players have no useful information on the other players’ value systems and thus of
what kinds of moves they are going to make in the game.
Symmetry. Players have equal rights in sharing the assets. A consequence of this assumption is
that, at a minimum, each player is entitled to a proportional share of the assets—when there are
two players, each is entitled to at least one-half of the assets, with three players each is entitled
to at least one-third of the assets, and so on.
(C) Fair Shares and Fair Divisions
Given a set of players P1, P2, c, PN and a set of assets S, the ultimate purpose of a fair-division
game is to produce a fair division of S. But what does this mean? To formalize the precise
meaning of this seemingly subjective idea, we introduce two very important definitions.
Fair share (to a player P ). Suppose that s denotes a share of the set of assets S and that P is
one of the players in a fair-division game with N players. The share s is called a proportional
1
fair share (or just simply a fair share) to P, if, in P’s opinion, the value of s is at least
of the
N
N
value of S.
Fair division (of the set of assets S ). Suppose we are able to divide the set of as- sets S into N
shares (call them s1, s2, , sN) and assign each of these shares to one of the players. If each player
1
considers the share he or she received to be a fair share (i.e.,
worth at least
of the value of
N
N
S), then we have achieved a fair division of the set of assets S.
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EXAMPLE 3.1 Fair Divisions
Three brothers—say Henry, Tom, and Fred—are splitting up their partnership and dividing a bunch of
assets of unspecified value. The set of assets S is divided into three shares: s1, s2, and s3. In Henry’s
opinion, the values of the three shares (expressed as a percentage of the value of S) are, respectively, 32%,
31% and 37%. This information is displayed in the first row of Table below. Likewise, the second and third
rows of the table show the values that each of the other two brothers assigns to each of the three shares.

s1

s2

s3

Henry

32%

31%

37%

Tom

34%

31%

35%

Fred

331,
3

331,
3

331,
3

Fair shares. To Henry, s3 is the only fair share (the other two shares fall below the fair-share threshold of
33 1%); to Tom, s1 and s3 are both fair shares; to Fred, who values all three shares equally, they are all fair
shares.
Fair divisions. To assign each player a fair share we start with Henry because with him we have only one
option—we have to assign him s3.
With Tom we seem to have, at least in principle, two options—s1 and s3 are both fair shares—but s3 is
gone, so our only choice is to assign him s1. This leaves the final share s2 for Fred. Since all three players
received a fair share, we have achieved a fair division. (Notice that this does not mean that all players are
equally happy—Tom would have been happier with s3 rather than s1, but such is life. All that a fair
division promises the players is that they will get a fair share, not the best share.)
EXAMPLE 3.2 Drawing Lots
Once again we go back to Henry, Tom, and Fred and their intention to split their partnership fairly. The
method they adopt for the split seems pretty reasonable: One of the brothers divides the assets into three
shares (s1, s2, and s3), and then they draw lots to determine the order in which they get to choose. The
values of the shares are as shown in the above Table. Say the order is Henry first, Tom second, and Fred
last. In this case Henry will undoubtedly choose s3, Tom will then choose s1, and Fred will end up with s2.
This works out fine, as this gives a fair division of S. So far, so good.
Suppose, however, that the when they draw lots the order is Tom first, Henry second, and Fred last. In this
case Tom will start by choosing s3. Now Henry has to choose between s1 and s2, neither of which is a fair
share. In this case the method fails to produce a fair division. Since drawing lots does not guarantee that
the final result will always be a fair division, it is not a fair-division method.
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There are many different fair-division methods known, but in this section we will discuss only a few of the
classic ones. Depending on the nature of the set S, a fair-division game can be classified as one of three
types: continuous, discrete, or mixed, and the fair-division methods used depend on which of these types
we are facing.
Continuous fair division. Here the set S is divisible in infinitely many ways, and shares can be increased
or decreased by arbitrarily small amounts. Typical examples of continuous fair-division games involve the
division of land, a cake, a pizza, and so forth.
Discrete fair division. Here the set S is made up of objects that are indivisible, like paintings, houses, cars,
boats, jewelry, and so on. (What about pieces of candy? One might argue that with a sharp enough knife a
piece of candy could be chopped up into smaller and smaller pieces, but nobody really does that— it’s
messy. As a semantic convenience let’s agree that candy is indivisible, and, therefore, dividing candy is a
discrete fair-division game.)
Mixed fair division. This is the case where some of the assets are continuous and some are discrete.
Dividing an estate consisting of jewelry, a house, and a parcel of land is a mixed fair-division game.
Fair-division methods are classified according to the nature of the problem involved. Thus, there are
discrete fair-division methods (used when the set S is made up of indivisible, discrete objects), and there
are continuous fair-division methods (used when the set S is an infinitely divisible, continuous set).
Mixed fair-division games can usually be solved by dividing the continuous and discrete parts separately,
so we will not discuss them in this chapter. We will start our excursion into fair-division methods with a
classic method for continuous fair division.

2.2 The Divider-Chooser Method
When two players are dividing a continuous asset, the standard method used is the divider-chooser method.
This method is also known as “you cut; I choose,” and most of us have used it at some time or another
when dividing a piece of cake, a sandwich, or a bowl of ice cream. As the name suggests, one player, called
the divider, divides S into two shares, and the second player, called the chooser, picks the share he or she
wants, leaving the other share to the divider.
EXAMPLE 3.3 Dividing a Cheesecake
On their first date, Damian and Cleo go to the county fair. They buy jointly a raffle ticket, and, as luck
would have it, they win a half chocolate–half strawberry cheesecake.
Damian likes chocolate and strawberry equally well, so in his eyes the chocolate and strawberry halves are
equal in value (Fig. 1). On the other hand, Cleo hates chocolate— she is allergic to it and gets sick if she
eats any—so in her eyes the value of the cake is 0% for the chocolate half, 100% for the strawberry part
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(Fig. 1). Once again, to ensure a fair division, we will assume that neither of them knows anything about
the other’s likes and dislikes.

Fig.1
Let’s now see how Damian and Cleo might divide this cake using the divider-chooser method. Damian
volunteers to go first and be the divider. His cut is shown in Fig. 2(a). Notice that this is a perfectly rational
division of the cake based on Damian’s value system—each piece is half of the cake and to him worth onehalf of the total value of the cake. It is now Cleo’s turn to choose, and her choice is obvious—she will pick
the piece having the larger straw- berry part [Fig. 2(b)].
Fig 2(a) (Damian cuts)

Fig 2(b) Cleo picks
The final outcome of this division is that Damian gets a piece that in his own eyes is worth exactly half of
the cake, but Cleo ends up with a much sweeter deal—a piece that in her own eyes is worth about twothirds of the cake. This is, nonetheless, a fair division of the cake—both players get pieces worth 50% or
more. Mission accomplished!
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EXAMPLE 3.3 illustrates why, given a choice, it is always better to be the chooser than the divider—the
divider is guaranteed a share worth exactly 50% of the total value of S, but with just a little luck the chooser
can end up with a share worth more than 50%. Since a fair-division method should treat all players equally,
both players should have an equal chance of being the chooser. This is best done by means of a coin toss,
with the winner of the coin toss getting the privilege of making the choice.
In the next two sections we will discuss discrete fair-division methods— methods for dividing assets
consisting of indivisible objects such as houses, cars, art, jewels, or candy. As a general rule of thumb,
discrete fair division is harder to achieve than continuous fair division because there is a lot less flexibility
in the division process, and discrete fair divisions that are truly fair are only pos- sible under a limited set of
conditions. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that while both of the methods we will discuss in the next
two sections have limitations, they still are the best methods we have available. Moreover, when they work,
both methods work remarkably well and produce surprisingly good fair divisions.

2.3 The Lone-Divider Method
The first important breakthrough in the mathematics of fair division came in 1943, when the Polish
mathematician Hugo Steinhaus came up with a clever way to extend some of the ideas in the dividerchooser method to the case of three players, one of whom plays the role of the divider and the other two
who play the role of choosers. Steinhaus’s approach was subsequently generalized to any number of
players N (one divider and N - 1 choosers) by Princeton mathematician Harold Kuhn. In either case we
will refer to this method as the lone-divider method
The lone-Divider method for Three Players
Step 0 (Preliminaries). One of the three players will be the divider; the other two players will be
choosers. Since it is better to be a chooser than a divider, the decision of who is what is made by a random
draw (rolling dice, drawing cards from a deck, etc.). For convenience we’ll call the divider D and the
choosers C1 and C2.
Step 1 (Division). The divider D divides the cake into three shares (s1, s2, and s3). D will get one of these
shares, but at this point does not know which one. Not knowing which share will be his (privacy
assumption) forces D to divide the cake into three shares of equal value (rationality assumption).
Step 2 (Bidding). C1 declares (usually by writing on a slip of paper) which of the three pieces are fair
shares to her. Independently, C2 does the same. These are the bids. A chooser’s bid must list every single
piece that he or she considers to be a fair share (i.e., worth one-third or more of the cake)—it may be
tempting to bid only for the very best piece, but this is a strategy that can easily backfire. To preserve the
privacy requirement, it is important that the bids be made independently, without the choosers being privy
to each other’s bids.
Step 3 (Distribution). Who gets which piece? The answer, of course, depends on which pieces are listed in
the bids. For convenience, we will separate the pieces into two types: C-pieces (these are pieces chosen by
either one or both of the choosers) and U-pieces (these are unwanted pieces that did not appear in either of
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1
the bids). Expressed in terms of value, a U-piece is a piece that both choosers value at less than 33 % , of
3
1
the cake, and a C-piece is a piece that at least one of the choosers (maybe both) values at 33 % , or more.
3
Depending on the number
of C-pieces, there are two separate cases to consider.
Case 1. When there are two or more C-pieces, there is always a way to give each chooser a different piece
from among the pieces listed in her bid. Once each chooser gets her piece, the divider gets the last
remaining piece. At this point every player has received a fair share, and a fair division has been
accomplished. (Sometimes we might end up in a situation in which C1 likes C2’s piece better than her own
and vice versa. In that case it is perfectly reasonable to let them swap pieces—this would make each of
them happier than they already were, and who could be against that?)
Case 2. When there is only one C-piece, we have a bit of a problem because it means that both choosers are
bidding for the very same piece[(a)]. The solution here requires a little more creativity. First, we take care
of the divider D—to whom all pieces are equal in value—by giving him one of the pieces that neither
chooser wants [(b)]. (If the two choosers can agree on the least desirable piece, then so much the better; if
they can’t agree, then the choice of which piece to give the divider can be made randomly.)
After D gets his piece, the two pieces left (the C-piece and the remaining U-piece) are recombined into one
piece that we call the B-piece [( c)]. Now we have one piece and two players and we can revert to the
divider-chooser method to finish the fair division: One player cuts the B-piece into two pieces; the other
player chooses the piece she likes best [(d)].

s3

(a)

s1

=

s2 =

s3

s3

(b)

s1

s2
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s3
s2

(c)

(d)
This process results in a fair division of the cake because it guarantees fair shares for all players. We know
that D ends up with a fair share by the very fact that D did the original division, but what about C1 and C2?
The key observation is that in the eyes of both C1 and C2 the B-piece is worth more than two-thirds of the
value of the original cake (think of the B-piece as 100% of the original cake minus a U-piece worth less
1
than 33 % ), so when we divide it fairly into two shares, each party is guaranteed more than one-third of
3
the original cake.
EXAMPLE 3.4 Lone Divider (Case 1, Version 1)
Dale, Cindy, and Cher are dividing a cake using Steinhaus’s lone-divider method. They draw cards from a
well-shuffled deck of cards, and Dale draws the low card (bad luck!) and has to be the divider
s1

s2

s3

Dale

331,

331,
3

331,

Cindy

35%

10%

55%

Cher

40%

25%

35%

3

3

Step 1 (Division). Dale divides the cake into three pieces
s1, s2, and s3. The table shows the values of the three pieces
in the eyes of each of the players.
Step 2 (Bidding). From the table we can assume that Cindy’s
bid list is {s1, s3}and Cher’s bid list is also{s1, s3}.
Step 3 (Distribution). The C-pieces are s1 and s3. There are two
possible distributions. One distribution would be: Cindy gets s1,
Cher gets s3, and Dale gets s2. An even better distribution (the
optimal distribution) would be: Cindy gets s3, Cher gets s1, and
Dale gets s2. In the case of the first distribution, both Cindy and
Cher would benefit by swapping pieces, and there is no rational
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reason why they would not do so. Thus, using the rationality
assumption, we can conclude that in either case the final result
will be the same: Cindy gets s3, Cher gets s1, and Dale gets s2.

EXAMPLE 3.5 Lone Divider (Case 1, Version 2)
We will use the same setup as in EXAMPLE 3.4- Dale is the divider, Cindy and Cher are the choosers.
s1

s2

s3

Dale

331,
3

331,
3

331,

Cindy

30%

40%

30%

Cher

60%

15%

25%

3

Step 1 (Division) Dale divides the cake into three pieces s1, s2, and s3. The above table shows the values of
the three pieces in the eyes of each of the players.
Step 2 (Bidding). Here Cindy’s bid list is {s2 } only, and Cher’s bid list is {s1 } only.
Step 3 (Distribution). This is the simplest of all situations, as there is only one possible distribution of the
pieces: Cindy gets s2, Cher gets s1, and Dale gets s3.

2.4

The Method of Sealed Bids

EXAMPLE 3.6 Settling Grandma’s Estate
In her last will and testament, Grandma plays a little joke on her four grandchildren (Art, Betty, Carla, and
Dave) by leaving just three items—a cabin in the mountains, a vintage 1955 Rolls Royce, and a Picasso
painting—with the stipulation that the items must remain with the grandchildren (not sold to outsiders) and
must be divided fairly among them. How can we possibly resolve this conundrum? The method of sealed
bids will give an ingenious and elegant solution.
Step 1 (Bidding). Each of the players makes a bid (in dollars) for
each of the items in the estate, giving his or her honest assessment
of the actual value of each
item. To satisfy the privacy
assumption, it is important that
the bids are done independently, and no player should
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Art
Cabin
Vintage Rolls
Painting
Total value
Fair-share value

Betty

Carla

Dave

420,000

450,000

411,000

398,000

80,000

70,000

87,000

92,000

680,000

640,000

634,000

590,000

1,180,000

1,160,000

1,132,000

1,080,000

295,000

290,000

283,000

270,000

be privy to another player’s bids
before making his or her own.
The easiest way to accomplish
this is for each player to submit
his or her bid in a sealed
envelope. When all the bids are
in, they are opened. The top three
rows in the table show each
player’s bid on each item in the
estate.

Step 2 (Allocation). Each item will go to the highest bidder for that item. (If there is a tie, the tie can be
broken with a coin flip). In this example the cabin goes to Betty, the vintage Rolls Royce goes to
Dave, and the Picasso painting goes to Art. Notice that Carla gets nothing. Not to worry—it all
works out at the end! (In this method it is possible for one player to get none of the items and
another player to get many or all of the items. Much like in a silent auction, it’s a matter of who
bids the highest.)
Step 3 (First Settlement). It’s now time to settle things up. Depending on what items (if any) a player
gets in Step 2, he or she will owe money to or be owed money by the estate. To determine how much a
player owes or is owed, we first calculate each player’s fair-share value of the estate (bottom row of the
table above). A player’s fair-share value is found by adding that player’s bids and dividing the total by
the number of players (in this case 4).
The fair-share values are the baseline for the settlements—if the total value of the items that the player
gets in Step 2 is more than his or her fair-share value, then the player pays the estate the difference. If
the total value of the items that the player gets is less than his or her fair-share value, then the player
gets the difference in cash. Here are the details of how the settlement works out for each of our four
players.
Table 8 illustrates how the first settlements are calculated. Take Art, for example. Art receives the
Picasso painting, which he valued at $680,000. But his fair-share value is only $295,000, so Art must
make up the difference of $385,000 by paying it to the estate. Likewise, Betty gets the cabin for
$450,000 but has to pay $160,000 to the estate. Carla is not getting any items, so she receives the full
value of her share ($283,000) in cash from the estate. Dave gets the vintage Rolls, which he values at
$92,000. Since he is entitled to a fair share valued at
$270,000, the difference is given to him in cash from the estate.

Art

Betty

Carla

Dave

Item(s) received

Picasso

Cabin

none

Rolls

Value received

$680,000

$450,000

Fair-share value

$295,000

$290,000

$283,000

$270,000

To (from) estate

$385,000

$160,000

($283,000)

($178,000)

0

$92,000

Surplus
$84,000
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At this point each of the four heirs has received a fair share, and we might consider our job done, but
this is not the end of the story—there is more to come (good news mostly!). If we add Art and Betty’s
payments to the estate and subtract the payments made by the estate to Carla and Dave, we discover
that there is a surplus of $84,000! ($385,000 and $160,000 came in from Art and Betty respectively;
$283,000 and $178,000 went out to Carla and Dave.)
Step 4 (Division of the Surplus). The surplus is common money that belongs to the estate, and thus is
to be divided equally among the players. In our example each player’s share of the $84,000 surplus is
$21,000.
Step 5 (Final Settlement). Everything done up to this point could be done on paper, but now,
finally, real money needs to change hands! Art gets the Picasso painting and pays the estate $364,000
($385,000 - $21,000). Betty gets the cabin and has to pay the estate $139,000 ($160,000 - $21,000).
Carla gets $284,000 in cash ($263,000 + $21,000). Dave gets the vintage Rolls Royce plus $199,000
($78,000 + $21,000).
When two players are dividing a commonly owned discrete asset, one of them will end up with the
asset and the other one must get an equivalent share of some- thing, usually money. The method of
sealed bids handles this situation nicely and provides a solution that makes both players happy
(assuming, of course, that they are rational players).
EXAMPLE 3.7 Splitting Up the House
Al and Betty are getting a divorce. The only joint property of any value is their house. Rather than
hiring attorneys and going to court to figure out how to split up the house, they agree to give the
method of sealed bids a try.
Al’s bid on the house is $340,000; Betty’s bid is $364,000. The fair-share value of the “estate” is
$170,000 to Al and $182,000 to Betty. Since Betty is the higher bidder, she gets to keep the house and
must pay Al cash for his share. The computation of how much cash Betty pays Al can be done in two
steps. In the first settlement, Betty owes the estate $182,000. Of this money, $170,000 pays for Al’s fair
share, leaving a surplus of $12,000 to be split equally between them. The bottom line is that Betty ends
up paying $176,000 to Al for his share of the house.
The following table summarizes the split.
Al

Betty

Bid for house

$340,000

$364,000

Fair-share value

$170,000

$182,000

To (from) estate

1$170,0002

$182,000

Share of surplus
Final settlement

$6,000

$6,000

gets

gets house,

$176,000

pays $176,000
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The method of sealed bids can provide an excellent solution not only to settlements of property in a
divorce but also to the equally difficult and often contentious issue of splitting up a partnership. The
catch is that in these kinds of splits we can rarely count on the rationality assumption to hold. A divorce
or partnership split devoid of emotion, spite, and hard feelings is a rare thing indeed!
Fine-Grained, Discrete Fair Division
Under the right set of circumstances, a discrete fair-division problem can be solved using continuous
fair-division methods. This happens when the set of assets consists of many items with plenty of
relatively low-valued items to “smooth” out the division. We call these situations “fine-grained” fairdivision games. To clarify the idea, imagine that you have a large pile of rocks and you want to split the
rocks into three piles of equal weight. If all you have is big boulders then it is not very likely you will
be able to do it, but if you also have a big supply of small rocks (the fine grain, so to speak) then your
chances of making three piles of equal weight are quite good.
Using continuous fair-division methods to solve discrete fair-division problems is very helpful—
continuous fair-division is easier and has fewer restrictions than discrete fair division. Our next
example illustrates how we can use a continuous fair- division method to solve a fine-grained, discrete
fair-division problem. It also brings us back full circle to the story of the Elghanayan brothers.
EXAMPLE 3.8 Dividing $3 Billion Worth of Real Estate
In 2009, Henry, Tom and Fred Elghanayan agreed to break up Rockrose Development Corporation, the
$3-billion New York City real estate empire they jointly owned (about 8000 apartments, 9 office
towers, and 9 major development projects). The breakup was reasonably amicable (there were a few
bruised egos but no hard feelings), and each of the three brothers ended up with a share that he
considered fair. How did they do it?
First, notice that because of the large number of apartments (the small rocks), this is an example of a
fine-grained, discrete, fair-division problem. Thus, it was possible to divide the assets into three shares
using a variation of the lone-divider method. Fred ended up as the divider (how he ended up with that
dubious honor will be explained soon), and his task was to divide the assets into three “piles” of equal
value. After Fred was finished with the division (it took him about 60 days to make up the three piles) a
coin flip was used to determine which of the other two brothers (the choosers) would get to choose first.
Henry won the coin flip, and this determined the order of choice: Henry first, Tom second, Fred last.
As in any lone-divider strategy, being the divider is the least desirable role, and to determine who
would end up in that role the brothers used a variation of the method of sealed bids: a reverse auction in
which the lowest bidder for the as- sets (Fred) got to be the divider. This insured that both choosers
valued the assets at a higher rate than the divider and guaranteed that Fred, knowing that he would
choose last, would divide the assets into three approximately equal shares.
The most important postscript to this story is that all three brothers were happy with the outcome of the
split, a very uncommon ending to such a big stakes division.
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EXERCISES
Fair-Division Games
1.

2.

Angie, Bev, Ceci, and Dina are dividing among themselves a set of common assets equally
owned by the four of them. The assets are divided into four shares (s1, s2, s3, and s4). Table 14
shows the values of the shares to each player ex- pressed as a percent of the total value of the
assets.
(a)

Which of the shares are fair shares to Angie?

(b)

Which of the shares are fair shares to Bev?

(c)

Which of the shares are fair shares to Ceci?

(d)

Which of the shares are fair shares to Dina?

(e)

Find all possible fair divisions of the assets using
s1, s2, s3, and s4 as shares.
s1

s2

s3

s4

Angie

22%

26%

28%

24%

Bev

25%

26%

22%

27%

Ceci

20%

30%

27%

23%

Dina

25%

25%

25%

25%

Mark, Tim, Maia, and Kelly are dividing among themselves a set of common assets equally
owned by the four of them. The assets are divided into four shares (s1, s2, s3, and s4). Table 15
shows the values of the shares to each player ex- pressed as a percent of the total value of the
assets.
(a)

Which of the shares are fair shares to Mark?

(b)

Which of the shares are fair shares to Tim?

(c)

Which of the shares are fair shares to Maia?

(d)

Which of the shares are fair shares to Kelly?

(e)

Find all possible fair divisions of the assets using
s1, s2, s3, and s4 as shares.
s1

s2

s3

s4

Mark

20%

32%

28%

20%

Tim

25%

25%

25%

25%

Maia

15%

15%

30%

40%

Kelly

24%

26%

24%

26%
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3.

4.

Allen, Brady, Cody, and Diane are sharing a cake. The cake had previously been divided into four
slices (s1, s2, s3, and s4). Table 16 shows the values of the slices in the eyes of each player.
(a)

Which of the slices are fair shares to Allen?

(b)

Which of the slices are fair shares to Brady?

(c)

Which of the slices are fair shares to Cody?

(d)

Which of the slices are fair shares to Diane?

(e)

Find all possible fair divisions of the cake using s1, s2, s3, and s4 as shares.
s1

s2

s3

s4

Allen

$4.00

$5.00

$6.00

$5.00

Brady

$3.00

$3.50

$4.00

$5.50

Cody

$6.00

$4.50

$3.50

$4.00

Diane

$7.00

$4.00

$4.00

$5.00

Carlos, Sonya, Tanner, and Wen are sharing a cake. The cake had previously been divided into
four slices (s1, s2, s3, and s4). Table 17 shows the values of the slices in the eyes of each player.
(a)

Which of the slices are fair shares to Carlos?

(b)

Which of the slices are fair shares to Sonya?

(c)

Which of the slices are fair shares to Tanner?

(d)

Which of the slices are fair shares to Wen?

(e)

Find all possible fair divisions of the cake using s1, s2, s3, and s4 as shares.
s1

s2

s3

s4

Carlos

$3.00

$5.00

$5.00

$3.00

Sonya

$4.50

$3.50

$4.50

$5.50

Tanner

$4.25

$4.50

$3.50

$3.75

Wen

$5.50

$4.00

$4.50

$6.00

The Divider-Chooser Method
5.

6.

Suppose that they flip a coin and Jared ends up being the divider.
(a)

Describe how Jared should cut the sandwich into two shares s1 and s2.

(b)

After Jared cuts, Karla gets to choose. Specify which of the two shares Karla should choose
and give the value of the share to Karla.

Suppose they flip a coin and Karla ends up being the divider.
(a)

Describe how Karla should cut the sandwich into two shares s1 and s2.
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(b)

7.

After Karla cuts, Jared gets to choose. Specify which of the two shares Jared should choose
and give the value of the share to Jared.

Suppose that they flip a coin and David ends up being the divider. (Assume that David is playing
the game by the rules and knows nothing about Paula’s likes and dislikes.)
(a)

Is the cut shown in (b) a possible 50-50 cut that David might have made as the divider? If
so, describe the share Paula should choose and give the value (as a percent) of that share to
Paula. If the cut is not a 50-50 cut, give the values of the two shares to David.

(b)

Is the cut shown in (c) a possible 50-50 cut that David might have made as the divider? If
so, describe the share Paula should choose and give the value (as a percent) of that share to
Paula. If the cut is not a 50-50 cut, give the values of the two shares to David.

(c)

Is the cut shown in (d) a possible 50-50 cut that David might have made as the divider? If
so, describe the share Paula should choose and give the value (as a percent) of that share to
Paula. If the cut is not a 50-50 cut, give the values of the two shares to David.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)
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8.

Suppose that they flip a coin and Paula ends up being the divider. (Assume that Paula is playing
the game by the rules and knows nothing about David’s likes and dislikes.)

(a)

Is the cut shown above in (b) a possible 50-50 cut that Paula might have made as the divider?
If so, describe the share David should choose and give the value (as a percent) of that share to
David. If the cut is not a 50-50 cut, give the values of the two shares to Paula.

(b)

Is the cut shown above in (c) a possible 50-50 cut that Paula might have made as the divider?
If so, describe the share David should choose and give the value (as a percent) of that share to
David. If the cut is not a 50-50 cut, give the values of the two shares to Paula.

The Lone-Divider Method
9.

Three partners are dividing a plot of land among them- selves using the lone-divider method.
After the divider D divides the land into three shares s1, s2, and s3, the choosers C1 and C2
submit their bids for these shares.
(a)

Suppose that the choosers’ bids are C1: {s2, s3 } ; C2: {s2, s3 } . Describe two different fair
divisions of the land.

(b)

Suppose that the choosers’ bids are C1: {s2, s3 } ; C2: {s1, s3 } . Describe three different fair
divisions of the land.

10. Three

partners are dividing a plot of land among them- selves using the lone-divider method.
After the divider D divides the land into three shares s1, s2, and s3, the choosers C1 and C2
submit their bids for these shares.

(a)

Suppose that the choosers’ bids are
divisions of the land.

C1: 5s2 6 ; C2: 5s1, s3 6 . Describe two different fair

Suppose that the choosers’ bids are C1: 5s1, s2 6 ; C2: 5s2, s3 6 . Describe three different fair
divisions of the land.
11. Four partners are dividing a plot of land among themselves using the lone-divider method.
After the divider D divides the land into four shares s1, s2, s3, and s4, the choosers C1, C2, and C3
submit their bids for these shares.
(b)

12.

(a)

Suppose that the choosers’ bids are C1: {s2 } ; C2: {s1, s3 } ; C3: {s2, s3} . Find a fair
division of the land. Explain why this is the only possible fair division.

(b)

Suppose that the choosers’ bids are C1: {s2, s3 } ; C2: {s1, s3 } ; C3: {s1, s2 } . Describe two
different fair divisions of the land.

(c)

Suppose that the choosers’ bids are C1: {s2 } ; C2: {s1, s3 } ; C3: {s1, s4 } . Describe three
different fair divisions of the land.

Mark, Tim, Maia, and Kelly are dividing a cake among them- selves using the lone-divider
method. The divider divides the cake into four slices (s1, s2, s3, and s4). Table 20 shows the
values of the slices to each player expressed as a percent of the total value of the cake.
(a)

Who was the divider?

(b)

Find a fair division of the cake.
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s1

s2

s3

s4

Mark

20%

32%

28%

20%

Tim

25%

25%

25%

25%

Maia

15%

15%

30%

40%

Kelly

24%

24%

24%

28%

The Method of Sealed Bids
13.

Andre, Bea, and Chad are dividing an estate consisting of a house, a small farm, and a painting
using the method of sealed bids. The table below shows the players’ bids on each of the items.
Andre

Bea

Chad

House

$150,000

$146,000

$175,000

Farm

$430,000

$425,000

$428,000

$50,000

$59,000

$57,000

Painting

(a)

Describe the first settlement of this fair division and compute the surplus.

(b)

Describe the final settlement of this fair-division problem.

14. Five

heirs (A, B, C, D, and E) are dividing an estate consisting of six items using the method of
sealed bids. The heirs’ bids on each of the items are given in table below.
A

B

C

D

E

Item 1

$352

$295

$395

$368

$324

Item 2

$98

$102

$98

$95

$105

Item 3

$460

$449

$510

$501

$476

Item 4

$852

$825

$832

$817

$843

Item 5

$513

$501

$505

$505

$491

Item 6

$725

$738

$750

$744

$761

(c)

Find the value of each player’s fair share.

(d)

Describe the first settlement (who gets which item and how much do they pay or get in
cash).

(e)

Find the surplus after the first settlement is over.

(f)

Describe the final settlement (who gets which item and how much do they pay or get in
cash).
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ANSWERS

1. (a) s2, s3

(b) s1, s2, s4 (c) s2, s3

(d) s1, s2, s3, s4

(e) 1. Angie gets s2; Bev gets s1; Ceci gets s3; Dina gets s4.
2. Angie gets s2; Bev gets s4; Ceci gets s3; Dina gets s1.
3. Angie gets s3; Bev gets s1; Ceci gets s2; Dina gets s4.
4. Angie gets s3; Bev gets s4; Ceci gets s2; Dina gets s1.
3. (a) s2, s3, s4

(b) s3, s4

(c) s1, s2

(d) s1, s4

(e) 1. Allen gets s2; Brady gets s3; Cody gets s1; Diane gets s4.
2. Allen gets s3; Brady gets s4; Cody gets s2; Diane gets s1.
3. Allen gets s4; Brady gets s3; Cody gets s2; Diane gets s1.
5. (a) s1: 30, 84; s2: 38, 124 (b) s1; $8.00
7. (a) yes; s2 (75%) (b) no (David values s2 at 60%, s1 at 40%.)
(c) yes; s2 (75%)
9. (a) C1: s2, C2: s3, D: s1 or C1: s3, C2: s2, D: s1
(b) C1: s2, C2: s1, D: s3 or C1: s2, C2: s3, D: s1 or C1: s3, C2: s1, D: s2
11.(a) C1: s2, C2: s1, C3: s3, D: s4 (First, C1 must receive s2. Then, C3
must receive s3. So, C2 receives s1 and D receives s4.)
c) C1: s2, C2: s1, C3: s4, D: s3 or C1: s2, C2: s3, C3: s1, D: s4 or C1: s2, C2: s3, C3: s4, D: s1
12. (a) Tim (b) Mark gets s2; Tim gets s1; Maia gets s3; Kelly gets s4
14. (a) A: $600; B: $582; C: $618; D: $606; E : $600
(b) In the first settlement, A gets items 4 and 5 and pays $765, B gets
$582, C gets items 1 and 3 and pays $287, D gets $606, and E gets items 2 and 6 and pays $266.
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3 FINANCIAL MATHEMATICS
The primary purpose of this section is to provide you with a few tools
needed for a basic understanding of financial mathematics. Reading
this section is not going to turn you into a Warren Buffett, but it
should help you better understand your financial options and stay
away from common traps. Think of this section as a basic primer for
survival in that jungle called the world of finance.
3.1 4.1 Percentages
A “fraction” with denominator 100 can be interpreted as a percentage, and the percentage symbol (%) is
used to indicate the presence of the hid- den denominator 100. Thus,

x% =

x
100

EXAMPLE 4.1 Comparing Test Scores
Suppose that in your English Lit class you scored 19 out of 25 on the quiz, 49.2 out of 60 on the midterm,
and 124.8 out of 150 on the final exam. Without reading further, can you guess which one was your best
score?
The numbers 19, 49.2, and 124.8 are called raw scores. Since each raw score is based on a different total, it
is hard to compare them directly, but we can do it easily once we express each score as a percentage of the
total number of points possible.
Quiz score = 19/25: Here we can do the arithmetic in our heads. If we just multiply both numerator and
denominator by 4, we get 19/25 = 76/100 = 76%.
Midterm score = 49.2/60: Here the arithmetic is a little harder, so one might want to use a calculator. 49.2
÷ 60 = 0.82 = 82%. (Since 0.82 = 82/100, it follows that 0.82 = 82%.) This score is a definite improvement
over the quiz score.
Final exam = 124.8/150: Once again, we use a calculator and get 124.8 ÷ 150 =
0.832 = 83.2%. This score is the best one. Well done!
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Example 4.1 illustrates the simple but important relation between decimals and percentages: decimals
can be converted to percentages through multiplication by 100, as in
0.76 = 76%, 1.325 = 132.5%, and 0.005 = 0.5%.
Conversely, percentages can be converted to decimals through division by 100, as in
100% = 1.0, 83.2% = 0.832, 71% = 0.075.
2

EXAMPLE 4.2 Restaurant Tip
Imagine you take an old friend out to dinner at a nice restaurant for her birthday. The final bill comes to
$56.80. Your friend suggests that since the service was good, you should tip (3/20)th of the bill. What kind
of tip is that?
After a moment’s thought, you realize that your friend, who can be a bit annoying at times, is simply
suggesting you should tip the standard 15%. After all, 3/20 = 15/100 = 15%.
Although 3/20 and 15% are mathematically equivalent, the latter is a much more convenient and familiar
way to express the amount of the tip. To compute the actual tip, you simply multiply the amount of the bill
by 0.15. In this case we get 0.15 * $56.80 = $8.52. (People use various
tricks to do this calculation in their heads. For an exact calculation you can first take 10% of the bill—in
this case $5.68—and then add the other 5% by computing half of the 10%—in this case
$2.84. If you don’t want to worry about nickels and dimes you can just round the
$5.68 to $6, add another $3 for the 5%, and make the tip $9.)
EXAMPLE 4.3 The Dow Jones Industrial Average
The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) is one of the most commonly used indicators of the overall state
of the stock market in the United States. (As of the writing of this material the DJIA hovered around
13,000.) We are going to illustrate the ups and downs of the DJIA with fictitious numbers.
Day 1: On a particular day, the DJIA closed at 12,875.
Day 2: The stock market has a good day and the DJIA closes at 13,029.50. This is an increase of 154.50
from the previous day. To express the increase as a percentage, we ask, 154.50 is what percent of 12,875
(the day 1 value that serves as our baseline)? The answer is obtained by simply dividing 154.50 by 12,875
(and then rewriting it as a percentage). Thus, the percentage increase from day 1 to day 2 is
154.50 ÷ 12,875 = 0.012 = 1.2%
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Day 3: The stock market has a pretty bad day and the DJIA closes at 12,508.32. This represents a decrease
from the previous day of 521.18. A better way to think of a decrease is as a negative increase, so we say
that the “increase” from day 2 to day 3 was 12,508.32 - 13,029.50 = -521.18. Once again, this increase can
be expressed as a percentage of the 13,029.50 by dividing:
-521.18 ÷ 13,029.50 = -0.04 = -4%

A summary of the basic rules for working with percentages (illustrated in EXAMPLES 4.1-4.3).
1.
To express the ratio A/B as a percentage, write the ratio as a decimal (i.e., carry out the division
A ÷ B), and multiply by 100.
2.
To express P% as a decimal, divide P by 100. When P is itself given as a decimal, move the decimal
point two places to the left.
3.

To find P% of B, multiply p times B (where p is P% expressed in decimal form).

4.

If you start with a baseline quantity B and add P% to it, you end up with a final value F that is

(100 + P)% of B. Using p again for the decimal form of P%, this can be expressed by the formula
F = (1 + p) B
This formula is valid for both positive and negative values of p.
5.

Solving the formula F = (1 + p) B for B, gives the formula for finding the baseline

B when you know the final value F and the percentage increase p: B =

F
.
(1 + p )

6.

Solving the formula F = (1 + p) B for p, gives the formula for finding the percentage increase when
F
F −B
p=
−1 =
B
B .
you know the baseline B and the final value F:
The percentage “increase” p can be positive, negative, or zero. When p is positive, we have a real
increase (F > B); when p is negative we have a decrease (F < B); when p is zero we have no change (F =
B).
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Interest is the price someone pays for the use of someone else’s money.
•

If you borrow money from a bank you must pay interest to the bank because you are renting their
money.

•

If you deposit money in a savings account, the bank must pay interest to you because they are
renting your money (so that they can turn around and rent it to someone else).

If L (the lender) lends $P to B (the borrower), then eventually L expects to get more than $P back
from B. If $F is the sum B eventually re- pays L, then the interest is the difference between the
principal and the repayment: I = F - P.
The main topic in this section is what are the rules that determine the value of I ?
The key variables involved in the computation of the interest on a loan are:
•
•
•
•
•

The principal P;
The interest rate r;
The term of the loan t;
The repayment schedule.
The type of interest used (simple or compounded).

Principal (P). This is the word used to describe the sum of money that the lender L lends the
borrower B.
Interest rate (r). This is the rate paid by the borrower B to the lender L for the use of the
principal P for a specific unit of time—usually a year. When the interest rate is expressed as a
percentage of the principal, and the unit of time is a year, the rate is called an annual percentage
rate (APR). The APR is the standard way that financial institutions describe the interest rates on
their loans.
Term (t). The term (or life) of a loan is the length of time the borrower is borrowing the money.
Repayment schedule. This is a schedule—agreed upon by lender and borrower—for the
repayment of the loan.
• In single payment loans the borrower repays the loan in a single lump sum payment at the
end of the term.
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• In installment loans the borrower repays the loan by making equal monthly payments over
the term of the loan.
• In credit card loans the repayment schedule is (up to a point) at the discretion of the
borrower.
Simple interest. When a loan is based on simple interest, the interest rate is applied only to the
principal P. In this situation the interest paid on the loan per unit of time is constant. Since an
early partial payment on a simple interest loan does not impact the total interest paid, the typical
repayment schedule for a simple interest loan is a single payment at the end of the loan.
Compound interest. When a loan is based on compound interest, the interest accumulates—first
you pay interest on the principal, next you pay interest on the principal and the interest, and so on.
For compound interest loans, making partial payments during the term of the loan reduces the
total interest paid, and in many cases such as car loans and mortgage loans, monthly payments
called installment payments are required by the lender.

60

3.2 Simple Interest
In simple interest, the cost of the loan is constant over time—the borrower pays the same
amount of interest on each time period over the term of the loan.
For simplicity let’s assume the most common situation: the interest rate r is an APR
expressed in decimal form. If P is the principal amount borrowed, the interest on the loan is
rP per year over the term of the loan, so that if the term of the loan is t years, the total
interest paid on the loan is I = trP
Simple interest formula.
F = P + trP = P (1 + tr). (future payoff F)
EXAMPLE 4.4 Borrowing under simple interest
Suppose you find a credit union that will give you a student loan under simple interest (this
is quite unusual, as most lenders would much rather lend money under compound interest).
The APR on the loan is 6%, 1r = 0.062, and the term of the loan is three years. Under these
terms the credit union will lend you up to a maximum of $6000.
Let’s suppose that you are thinking about borrowing P = $5000. At the end of the three-year
term (t = 3) you will have to repay the credit union the original principal of $5000 plus
interest equal to I = 3 * 0.06 * $5000 = $900.
Now suppose that you decide you can afford to borrow a little more—just enough so that
your interest at the end of the three-year term is $1000. How much should you borrow? Here
you know the interest I, and the principal P is the unknown. The simple interest formula
gives $1000 = 3 * 0.06 * P. Solving for P gives P = $5555.56.
A more interesting situation arises if you want to pay off the loan early. Suppose that two
and a half years after you take out the $5000 loan you come into some money and decide you
want to pay the loan back. Can you compute the interest by plugging t = 2.5 into the simple
interest formula? The answer depends on the fine print in your loan agreement. If the loan
agreement allows you to pay off the loan before the end of the original term, then yes, the
interest you will owe after 2.5 years is given by I = 2.5 * 0.06 * $5000 = $750, and your
payoff will be F = $5750. A more likely scenario, however, is that your loan term is fixed at
three years and whether you pay off the loan early or not the credit union will demand a
payoff of $5900.

61

BONDS
Simple interest is also used on certain types of investment instruments, such as government
and corporate bonds. Government agencies, including the United States government, states,
cities, and municipalities issue bonds as a way to raise money.

When you buy a bond, you are essentially lending your money to the agency
issuing the bond.
The typical bond is defined by:

• The term of the bond (3 years, 5 years, etc.);
• The APR, and
• The face value F of the bond. The face value (also called the par value), of a bond is
the amount you get back from the issuing agency when the bond reaches maturity
(i.e., at the end of the term).
EXAMPLE 4.5 Buying Municipal Bonds
Suppose you have the opportunity to buy a five-year municipal bond with a face value of
$1000 and an APR of 3.25% (r = 0.0325). What is the original price of the bond?
We can answer this question using the simple
interest formula, but we have to be a little
11 + tr2
careful: the face value is the payoff F, so the formula that applies now is F = P + trP. The
F
unknown in this case is the principal P, and solving for P gives P =
. In our
(1 + rt )
example, F = $1000, t = 5 and r = 0.0325, so

=
P

1000
1000
= = $860.22 (rounded to the nearest penny)
1 + 0.0325 ∗ 5 1.1625

PAYDAY LOANS
A payday loan is a short-term loan in which a person can borrow a small sum (usually a
maximum of $1000 or $1500) using a future paycheck as collateral. These loans usually have
to be repaid when the borrower gets his next paycheck.
There is sound logic behind the payday loan business: sometimes people are short on cash or
have an emergency where they need quick access to money and don’t have the time or
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patience to go to a bank and apply for a conventional loan. Helping people out of temporary
jams is a good thing to do, and in this sense, payday loan companies provide a good service.
And, since payday loan companies operate with higher risk factors, it is reasonable and
expected that they will charge higher interest rates than conventional banks.
EXAMPLE 4.6 The Steep Price of Quick Cash
Your best friend has put together a fantastic road trip for spring break. All you need is $400
for your share of the gas, food, lodging, and miscellaneous expenses. You really want to go,
but you have no savings, your credit card is maxed out, and your last semester grades were
not so great, so asking your parents is out of the question.
You always wondered about that QuickCash&Go branch in your neighborhood.(one of
several dozen payday loan companies that operate across the United States). What would it
take to get a quick $400 loan from them? You have that tax refund check coming soon that
you can use as collateral, so you decide to check it out.
QuickCash&Go charges $15 for every $100 lent. The term of the loan is 14 days—you must
pay back the principal plus interest in two weeks! The total interest on a $400 loan is I = 4 *
$15 = $60. An interest charge of $60 on a $400 loan may not seem exorbitant, but let’s check
I
out the APR on this loan. Solving the simple interest formula I = Prt for r, gives r =
. In
pt
our example, I = $60 and P = $400. What about t? Since the interest rate is annual, we need
14
14
to express the term of the loan in years: 14 days =
years means that t =
. Putting it
365
365
all together gives

(1.048)t r =

60 365
∗
≈ 3.9107 ≈ 391.07%
400 14

Yikes!

3.3 Compound Interest
Under simple interest the interest rate is applied only to the principal. Under compound interest, not
only does the principal generate interest, so does the previously accumulated interest. All other things
being equal, money invested under compound interest grows a lot faster than money invested under
simple interest, and this difference gets magnified over time. If you are investing for the long haul (a
college trust fund, a retirement account, etc.), always look for compound interest.
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ANNUAL COMPOUND
EXAMPLE 4.7 Your Trust Fund Found
Imagine that you have just discovered the following bit of startling news:

On the day you were born, your Uncle Nick deposited $5000 in your name in a
trust fund account. The trust fund account pays a 6% APR and the interest is
compounded once a year at the end of the year. One of the provisions of the trust
fund was that you could not touch the money until you turned 18.
You are now 18 years, 10 months old and you are wondering

•

How much money is in the trust fund account now?

•

How much money would there be in the trust fund account if I wait until my next birthday
when I turn 19?

•

How much money would there be in the trust fund account if I left the money in for retirement
and waited until I turned 60?

Here is an abbreviated timeline of the money in your trust fund account, starting with the day
you were born:
Day you were born: Uncle Nick opens the account with a $5000 deposit.
First birthday: 6% interest is added to the account. Balance in account is
(1.06) $5000. (We’ll leave the expression alone and do the arithmetic later.)
Second birthday: 6% interest is added to the previous balance. Balance in account is
(1.06) (1.06)$5000 = (1.06) 2 $5000.

Third birthday: 6% interest is added to the previous balance. Balance in account is (1.06)
(1.06) 2 $5000 = (1.06)3 $5000.
Thus,
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Eighteenth birthday: The balance in the account is (1.06)18 $5000. It is finally time to pull
out a calculator and do the computation: = $14,271.70 (rounded to the nearest penny)
Today: Remember—right now you are supposed to be 18 years and 10 months old. Since the
bank only credits interest to your trust fund account once a year and you haven’t turned 19
yet, the balance in the account is still $14,271.70.
Nineteenth birthday: The future value of the account on your nineteenth birthday will be
(1.06)19 $5000 = $15,128 (rounded to the nearest penny)

Sixtieth birthday: The future value of the trust fund account is

(1.06)60 $5000 = $164,938.45

which is an amazing return for a $5000 investment (if you are willing to wait, of course)!

*Annual Compounding formula. The future value F of P dollars compounded
annually for t years with an APR r is F = P (1 + r)t.
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT
A certificate of deposit (CD) is a type of investment that is a hybrid between an ordinary
savings account and a bond. Much like a bond, when you buy a CD you are lending your
money—in this case to a bank or credit union—for a fixed term and at a fixed APR. Unlike a
bond, however, the interest on a CD is compounded, usually on an annual basis, but semiannual or monthly compounding are also possible.
Like an ordinary savings account, a CD is an extremely safe investment, and it usually offers
a much higher rate of return. Unlike a savings account, however, the money in a CD is pretty
much locked up for the term of the CD—if you want to take your money out before the CD
matures, you have to pay a pretty steep early withdrawal penalty. At the end of the CD’s term
you must cash out, although you always have the option to roll the money over to a new CD
(with new terms and a new APR). The cash value of the CD at the end of its term is referred
to as the future value.
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EXAMPLE 4.8 Future Value of a CD Under Annual Compounding
Suppose you invest $1500 on a CD with an APR of 4.8% compounded annually. Let t denote
the length (in years) of the CD’s term. Using the annual compounding formula with P =
$1500 and r = 0.048 gives the future value F of the CD when it matures in t years:
F = $1500 (1.048)t . The table below shows the values of F corresponding to 1-, 2-, 5-, 10-,
and 15-year CDs.

t

F $1500 ( 1.048 ) t

1

$1572.00

2

$1647.46

5

$1896.26

10

$2397.20

15

$3030.47

Rule of 72. To estimate how long it takes (in years) to double an investment
under annual compounding, take the number 72 and divide it by the APR (here
you use the percentage value of the APR).
GENERAL COMPOUNDING
Every so often, one can find a bank or credit union that offers CDs compounded more than
once a year—twice a year (semi-annually), four times a year (quarterly), even 12 times a
year (monthly). In the case of savings accounts, there is daily compounding and even
continuous compounding. The more frequent the compounding the better it is for the investor
as more and more interest accumulates on the principal, but as we will soon see, the
frequency of compounding has less of an impact than one would expect.
EXAMPLE 4.9 Future Value of a CD Under Quarterly Compounding
For comparison purposes we will use the same principal (P = $1500) and the same APR
(4.8%) as in Example 4.8. The only difference is that we are now looking at a CD that
compounds quarterly (four times a year).
We will start by computing the future value of the CD after one year (four quarters). To do so
we need to find the balance on the account at the beginning of each quarter—that is the
amount that generates the interest for that quarter. The computation is analogous to the one
we used in Example 4.8 with one important difference: the interest rate for the quarter is
not 4.8% (that’s the APR!) but rather 1.2% (the APR divided by four!).
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t

T

F =$1500 . ( 1.012 ) T

1

4

$1573.31

2

8

$1650.20

5

20

$1904.15

10

40

$2417.20

15

60

$3068.47

First quarter: Starting balance is P = $1500.
Second quarter: Starting balance: $1500 * (1.012).
Third quarter: Starting balance: $1500 * (1.012) 2 .
Fourth quarter: Starting balance: $1500 * (1.012)3 .
Balance at the end of one year: $1500 * (1.012) 4 =$1573.31.

We can use the same basic idea to find the future value of the CD after any number of years.
The only number that will change is the exponent of (1.012). Table 2 shows the future value
of the CD after t = 1, 2, 5, 10, and 15 years under quarterly compounding. Notice the
introduction of a new variable T representing the total number of times the interest was
compounded.
EXAMPLE 4.10 Future Value of a CD Under Monthly Compounding
We now consider the future value of a CD under monthly compounding (12 times a year).
For comparison purposes we will still use the principal P = $1500 and the APR of 4.8%, as in
Examples 4.8 and 4.9.
 120 
(0.018)

 365 

e
Now the interest rate in each compounding period is ($1662.90) = 0.4% = 0.004, and there
 54 
(0.018)

 365 

e
are 12 compounding periods per year. The future value of the CD after one year is given
by F = $1500 * (1.004)12 = $1573.61. The table below shows the future value of the CD after
t = 1, 2, 5, 10, and 15 years under monthly compounding. The total number of times the
interest was compounded is given by T.
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t

T

F =$1500.( 1.004 ) T

1

12

$1573.61

2

24

$1650.82

5

60

$1905.96

10

120

$2421.79

15

180

$3077.23

The idea behind Examples 4.9 and 4.10 can be generalized into what is known as the
general compounding formula.

General Compounding formula. The future value F of the principal P dollars
compounded a total of T times at a periodic interest rate p is F = P (1 + p)T.
The general compounding formula F = P (1 + p)T is an extension of the annual compounding
formula F = P (1 + r)t, but with two changes: The APR r is replaced by the periodic interest
rate p (obtained by dividing the APR by the number of compounding periods in one year),
and the number of years t in the exponent is replaced by T (the total number of times the
interest is compounded over the life of the investment).
The table below shows the details of the general compounding formula when applied to a 15year CD (t = 15) with a principal P = $1500 and an APR of 4.8% using annual, semi-annual,
quarterly, monthly, and daily compounding.

p

T

F $1500 1 1 p 2 T

annually

0.048

15

$3030.47

semi-annually

0.024

30

$3055.55

quarterly

0.012

60

$3068.47

monthly

0.004

180

$3077.23

0.048
365

365 * 15 = 5475

$3081.50

Compounding

daily*
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The surprising thing about the future values in the above Table is how
little they change as we crank up the frequency of compounding. You
would think that over 15 years the difference between daily compounding
and monthly compounding should be huge— in reality the difference buys
you a cup of coffee and a bagel (if you are lucky)!
CONTINUOUS COMPOUNDING
The ultimate form of compounding is continuous compounding—interest compounded
infinitely often over infinitely small compounding periods.
There is a surprisingly nice formula for computing future values under continuous
compounding called the continuous compounding formula. The surprise is that the formula
involves an unexpected guest—the irrational number e = 2.71828. . .

Continuous Compounding formula. The future value F of the principal P
dollars compounded continuously for t years with an APR r is F = Pert .
To use the continuous compounding formula, you will need a calculator with an ex key.
Since e is an irrational number with an infinite, nonrepeating decimal expansion, a calculator
can only give an approximate value for F itself. You can minimize the error by using a good
scientific calculator. There are many good online scientific calculators available for free.
The continuous compounding formula works even when the term t is a fractional part of a
1
=
t 5= 5.25
4
year. For example, for a term of 5 years and 3 months you can use
;

=
t
for a term of 500 days you can use

500
135
= 1 = 1.36986301 , and so on.
365
365

EXAMPLE 4.11 Future Value of a CD Under Continuous Compounding
For the last time, let’s consider a CD with principal P = $1500 and APR of 4.8%, as in
Examples 4.8 through 4.11, but this time the compounding is continuous. The table below
shows the future value of the CD for terms of 1, 2, 5, 10, and 15 years.
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Compare the numbers in the tables in Examples 4.8, 4.9 with those in the table below, and
you will understand why banks and credit unions don’t mind offering their customers
continuous compounding on savings accounts and CDs. It’s better business to entice customers with continuous compounding than to offer higher APRs. (For example, a CD with 4.8%
APR compounded quarterly is a much better offer than a CD with 4.7% APR compounded
continuously, even though the latter sounds a lot more impressive.)

t

F

$1500e 10.0482 t

1

$1573.76

2

$1651.14

5

$1906.87

10

$2424.11

15

$3081.65

SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
Other than putting your money under the mattress, a savings account is the most
conservative type of investment you can make. Savings accounts are extremely safe, and
extremely liquid—in general you can take part or all of the money out at any time without a
penalty.
Unlike a CD, a savings account,
• has no term (you can leave your money in the savings account for as long as you
want)
• the APR is not locked—it may go up or down depending on interest rates in general.
• the interest is compounded continuously.
• There is just one problem with savings accounts—they have very low APRs, and,
therefore, you don’t get very much interest. That’s the price you have to pay if you
want a secure, safe, and liquid investment.
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EXAMPLE 4.12 Continuous Compounding in Savings Accounts
Imagine you have a savings account with an APR of 1.8% compounded continuously. Your
passbook shows a starting balance of $1500 on January 1, a withdrawal of $250 on March
27, a deposit of $400 on July 10, and a withdrawal of $300 on September 2. Let’s track the
balances on your account for one calendar year (Jan. 1–Dec. 31).

date
Jan. 1

P

number
of days
in period

t

balance
F = Pert

deposit
(withdrawal)

Ending
balance

0

$0

$1500

$1500

$0

0

March 27

$1500

86

86
365

$1506.38

1$2502

$1256.38

July 10

$1256.38

105

105
365

$1262.90

$400

$1662.90

Sept. 2

$1662.90

54

54
365

$1667.33

1$3002

$1367.33

Dec. 31

$1367.33

120

120
365

$1375.45

$0

$1375.45

The deposit and withdrawals break up the calendar year into periods of various lengths. The
above table (column 3) shows the length of each period and how the continuous
compounding formula is applied to compute the balance in the account (column 5).
There are 86 days in the period from January 1 to March 27—measured in years gives
t=

 86 

(0.018)

86
 365 
. The balance on March 27 is given by F = $1500. e
= $1506.38.
365

After a $250 withdrawal on March 27, the principal for the next period of 105 days (March
28–July 10) equals $1256.38. The balance on July 10 is ($1256.38) . e

 105 
(0.018)

 365 

= $1262.90.

After a $400 deposit on July 10, the principal for the next period of 54 days (July 11–Sept.
2) equals $1662.90. The balance on Sept. 2 is ($1662.90). e
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 54 
(0.018)

 365 

= $1667.33.

After a $300 withdrawal on Sept. 2, the principal equals $1367.33.
Since there are no other deposits or withdrawals, the last period is Sept.
3 to Dec. 31 (120 days) and the balance at the end of the calendar year is
($1367.33). e

 120 
(0.018)

 365 

= $1375.45.

ANNUAL PERCENTAGE YIELD
The APY (sometimes called the effective rate) is the annual percentage increase on the
value of an investment (or loan) when both the APR and the frequency of compounding are
considered. When comparing investments with different APRs and different compounding
frequencies, the APY is the right tool to use.
Given the APR and the compounding frequency, the simplest way to find the APY is to
compute the value of $1 at the end of one year. Depending on the type of compounding, we
use either the general or the continuous compounding formula.
EXAMPLE 4.13 Comparing Investments
Which is a better investment: a 4.8% APR compounded quarterly or a 4.75% APR
compounded continuously?

=
• 4.8% APR compounded quarterly
(p

0.048
= 0.012 ): In one year, P = $1
4

becomes F = $1 * (1.012) 4 ≈ $1.04887 (here we used the general compounding formula with
T = 4). The percentage increase can be read directly from the decimal part of F—it is
4.887%. The APY, therefore, is 4.887%.

• 4.7% APR compounded continuously: In one year, P = $1 becomes F = $1 * e0.0475 =
$1.048646 (here we used the continuous compounding formula with t = 1). The APY,
therefore, is 4.8646%.
Comparing the two APYs, we can see that an APR of 4.8% compounded quarterly gives a
better deal than an APR of 4.75% compounded continuously, but not by much.
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In general, if the APR is r (expressed as a decimal), the APY is given by:
T

 r
• APY= 1 +  − 1 when the compounding takes place T times a year.
 T
• APY=
when the compounding is continuous.
Rather than memorize two more formulas, remember that what we are doing is finding the
value of one dollar at the end of one year (using either the general or the continuous
compounding formula), subtracting 1, and expressing the result as a percentage. The next
example illustrates the point.
EXAMPLE 4.14 Computation of APYS
The table below shows the computation of APYs for a 6% APR under various compounding
frequencies.

Compounding

T

F

annually

1

1.06

semi-annually

2

(1 + 0.06)2 =2 1.0609

6.090%

quarterly

4

(1 + 0.06)4 ≈ 1.061364

6.1364%

monthly

12

(1 + 0.06)12 ≈ 1.061678
12

6.1678%

≈ 1.061837

6.1837%

continuously

4

e0.06
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APY

6.000%

EXERCISES
Percentages
1. Write each of the following percentages as a decimal.
(a) 6.25%
(b) 33%
(c) 7 %
2. Express each of the following percentages as a decimal.
(a) 0.82%
(b) 0.05%
3. There were four different sections of Financial Mathematics 101 offered last semester.
In section A, 31 out of 38 students passed the class; in section B, 47 out of 56 students
passed the class; in section C, 34 out of 45 students passed the class; and in section D,
45 out of 52 students passed the class. Compare the passing rates in each section and
rank them from best to worst.
4. A 250-piece puzzle is missing 14% of its pieces from its box. How many pieces are in
the box?
5. At the Happy Ville Mall, you buy a pair of earrings that are marked $6.95. After sales
tax, the bill was $7.61. What is the tax rate in Happy Ville (to the nearest tenth of a
percent)?
6. The inflation rate in 2011 was 3.16%. (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.) Use this
rate to find what salary at the end of 2010 would be equivalent to a $50,000 salary at
the end of 2011.

7. For three consecutive years the tuition at Tasmania State University increased by 10%,
15%, and 10%, respectively. What was the overall percentage increase of tuition
during the three-year period?
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8. A shoe store marks up the price of its shoes at 120% over cost. A pair of shoes goes on
sale for 20% off and then goes on the clearance rack for an additional 30% off. A
customer walks in with a 10% off coupon good on all clearance items and buys the
shoes. Express the store’s profit on these shoes as a percentage of the original cost.
9. Over a period of one week, the Dow Jones Industrial Aver- age (DJIA) did the
following: On Monday the DJIA went up by 2.5%, on Tuesday it went up by 12.1%,
on Wednesday it went down by 4.7%, on Thursday it went up by 0.8%, and on Friday
it went down by 5.4%. What was the percent- age increase/decrease of the DJIA over
the week? Round your answer to the nearest tenth of a percentage point.
10. Warren Buffet, who paid an estimated $8,142,000 in federal taxes in
2006,
recently commented that he pays 17.7% of his income in federal income tax, whereas his
employees pay an average of 32.9% of their wages in federal income taxes.
(a)
Determine Buffet’s 2006 income.
(b)
In 2006, the social security tax rate (paid only on the first $94,200 of income)
was 6.2%. What percentage of Buffet’s income was paid in Social Security taxes in
2006?

Simple Interest
11.Suppose you borrow $875 for a term of four years at simple interest and
How much is the total (principal plus interest) you must pay back on the loan?

12.Suppose you purchase a four-year bond with an APR of 5.75%. The face
bond is $4920. Find the purchase price of the bond.

4.28% APR.

value of the

13.Suppose you purchase an eight-year bond for $5400. The face value of the bond when it
matures is $8316. Find the APR.

14.Find the APR of a bond that doubles its value in 12 years. Round your answer to the nearest
hundredth of a percent.

15.Advance America is a payday loan company that offers quick, short-term loans using the
borrower’s future pay- checks as collateral. Advance America charges $17 for each $100
loaned for a term of 14 days. Find the APR charged by Advance America
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Compound Interest
16. Find the future value of an investment of P = $3250 com- pounded annually with a 9%
APR for a term of
(a)

four years.

(b)

five and a half years.

17. Between 1990 and 2010 the average annual inflation rate was 3.5%. Find the salary in
2010 dollars that would be equivalent to a $25,000 salary in 1990.
18. Consider a CD paying a 3% APR compounded monthly.
(a) Find the periodic interest rate.
(b) Find the future value of the CD if you invest $1580 for a term of three years.
19. Consider a CD paying a 3% APR compounded daily.
a. Find the periodic interest rate. Leave your answer in fractional form.
b. Find the future value of the CD if you invest $1580 for a term of three years.
20. Consider a CD paying a 3% APR compounded continuously. Find the future value of the
CD if you invest $1580 for a term of three years.
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ANSWERS

1. (a) 0.0625
3. (a) 0.0082

(b) 0.0375

(c) 0.007

(b) 0.0005

7. 215
9. 9.5%
11.

50, 000
= $48,468.40.
1.0316

13. 39.15%
15. 10.88%
17. an increase of 4.4%
19. (a) $46,000,000 (b) approximately 0.0127%
21. $1024.80
23. $4000
25. 6.75%

27. 8.33%
31. r = 4.432 = 443.2%.

33. (a) $3250(1.09)4 = $4587.64
(b) $3250(1.09)5 = $5000.53.
35. $25,000(1.035)20 = $49,744.72.
37. (a) 0.25%

(b) $1580(1.0025)36 = $1728.60

41. $1580e(0.03)*3 = $1728.80.
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4 SHAPE AND FORMS
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4.1 Rigid Motions

The act of taking an object and moving it from some starting position to some ending
position without altering its shape or size is called a rigid motion (and sometimes an
isometry).
Since in a rigid motion the size and shape of an object are not altered, distances between
points are preserved: The distance between any two points X and Y in the starting position is
the same as the distance between the same two points in the ending position.
If, in the process of moving the object, we stretch it, tear it, or generally alter its shape or
size, the motion is not a rigid motion.

In the case of two-dimensional objects moving in a plane, there are only four types of rigid
motions (called basic rigid motions):

(1) Reflections
(2) Rotations
(3) Translations
(4) Glide reflections
4.2 Reflections
A reflection in the plane is a rigid motion that moves an object into a new position that is a
mirror image of the starting position. In two dimensions, the “mirror” is a line called the axis
of reflection.
From a purely geometric point of view, a reflection can be defined by showing how it moves
a generic point P in the plane. This is shown in the Figure below: The image of any point P
is found by drawing a line through P perpendicular to the axis of reflection l and finding the
point P on the opposite side of l at the same distance as P from l (a). Points on the axis itself
are fixed points of the reflection (b).
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(a)

(b)

EXAMPLE 5.1 Reflections of a triangle

(a)

(b)

(c)

The above figures show three cases of reflection of a triangle ABC. In all cases the original
triangle ABC is shaded in blue and the reflected triangle is shaded in red.
In (a), the axis of reflection does not intersect the triangle,
In (b), the axis of reflection cuts through the triangle ABC. Here, the points where the axis
of reflection intersects the triangle are fixed points.
In (c), the reflected triangle falls on top of the original triangle.

80

The following are simple but useful properties of a reflection.
1.A reflection is completely determined by its axis l. If we know the axis of reflection, we
can find the image of any point P under the reflection (just drop a perpendicular to the axis
through P and find the point on the other side of the axis that is at an equal distance).
2.A reflection is completely determined by two points (a point and its image). If we know a
point P and its image P under the reflection (and assuming P is different from P), we can find
the axis l of the reflection (it is the perpendicular bisector of the segment PP ). Once we have
the axis l of the reflection, we can find the image of any other point (property 1).
3.A reflection has infinitely many fixed points. The fixed points of a reflection are all the points
on the axis l. Points not on the axis of reflection are never fixed.
4.Reflections are improper rigid motions. An improper rigid motion is one that changes the leftright and clockwise-counterclockwise orientations of objects. This property is the reason a left
hand reflected in a mirror looks like a right hand and the hands of a clock reflected in a mirror
move counterclockwise.
5.Under a reflection, the image of the image is the original object. For any point P, if P is its
image then the image of P is P. This means that when we apply the same reflection twice,
every point ends up in its original position and the rigid motion is equivalent to not having
moved the object at all.
.

4.3 Rotations
Informally, a rotation in the plane is a rigid motion that pivots or swings an object around a
fixed-point O. A rotation is defined by two pieces of information:
(1) The roto center (the point O that acts as the center of the rotation) and
(2) The angle of rotation ( the measure indicating the amount of rotation). In addition, it is
necessary to specify the direction (clockwise or counterclockwise) associated with the angle
of rotation.
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O
The above figure illustrates geometrically how a clockwise rotation with rotocenter O
and angle of rotation moves a blue point to the red point.
EXAMPLE 5.2 Rotations of a triangle

(a)

(b)

(c)

The following are some important properties of a rotation.
1.

2.
3.

A rotation is completely determined by four points (two points and their respective
images). Unlike a reflection, a rotation cannot be determined by a single point- image
pair P and ; it takes a second point-image pair Q and Q to nail down the rotation. The
reason is that infinitely many rotations can move P to P: Any point located on the
perpendicular bisector of the segment PP can be a rotocenter for such a rotation, as shown
in (a). Given a second pair of points Q and Q we can identify the rotocenter O as the
point where the perpendicular bisectors of PP and QQ meet, as shown in (b). Once we
have identified the rotocenter O, the angle of rotation is given by the measure of angle
POP (or for that matter QOQ —they are the same). [Note: In the special case where PP
and QQ happen to have the same perpendicular bisector, as in (c), the rotocenter O is the
intersection of PQ and P Q .]
The rotocenter is the only fixed point of a rotation. This is true for all rotations except for
the identity (where all points are fixed points).
A rotation is a proper rigid motion. A proper rigid motion is one where the left-right and
clockwise-counterclockwise orientations are preserved. A rotated left hand remains a left
hand, and the hands of a rotated clock still move in the clockwise direction.
A common misconception is to confuse a 180 rotation with a reflection, but we can see
that they are very different from just observing that the reflection is an improper rigid
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4.

motion, whereas the 180 rotation is a proper rigid motion.
A 360° rotation is the identity motion. A 360 rotation is equivalent to a 0 rotation, and
a 0 rotation is just the identity motion. (The expression “going around full circle” is the
well-known colloquial version of this property.)
It follows that all rotations can be described using an angle of rotation between 0 and 360
. For angles larger than 360 we divide the angle by 360 and just use the remainder (for
example, a clockwise rotation by 759 is equivalent to a clockwise rotation by 39 ; the
remaining 720 count as 0 ). In addition, we can describe a

(a)

(c)

(b)

4.4 5.4 Translations
A translation consists of essentially dragging an object in a specified direction and by a
specified amount (the length of the translation). The two pieces of information (direction and
→

length of the translation) are combined in the form of a vector of translation v . The vector
of translation is represented by an arrow—the arrow points in the direction of translation and
the length of the arrow is the length of the translation.
EXAMPLE 5.3 Translation of a triangle
The figure below illustrates the translation of a triangle ABC. Two “different” arrows are
shown in the figure, but they both have the same length and direction, so they de- scribe the
same vector of translation.
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The following are some important properties of a translation.
1.A translation is completely determined by two points (a point and its image). If we are
given a point P and its image P under a translation, the arrow joining P to P gives the vector
of the translation. Once we know the vector of the translation, we know where the translation
moves any other point.
2.A translation has no fixed points. In a translation, every point gets moved some distance
and, in some direction, so there can’t be any fixed points.
3.A translation is a proper rigid motion. When an object is translated, left-right and
clockwise-counterclockwise orientations are preserved.
4.A translation followed by the same translation in the opposite direction is the identity.

4.5 Glide Reflections
A glide reflection is a rigid motion obtained by combining a translation (the glide) with a
reflection. Moreover, the axis of reflection must be parallel to the direction of translation.
Thus, a glide reflection is described by two things: the vector of the translation and the axis of
the reflection l, and these two must be parallel.
EXAMPLE 5.4 Glide reflection of a triangle

Figure 15 illustrates the result of applying the glide reflection with vector and axis l to the
triangle ABC. We can do this in two different ways, but the result will be the same. In (a),
the translation is applied first, moving triangle ABC to the intermediate position A*B*C*.
The reflection is then applied to A*B*C*, giving the final position A B C . If we apply the
reflection first, the triangle ABC gets moved to the intermediate position A*B*C* [(b)] and
then translated to the final position A B C .
Notice that any point and its image under the glide reflection [for example, A and A in
(a)] are on opposite sides but equidistant from the axis l. This implies that the midpoint of
the segment joining a point and its image under a glide reflection must fall on the axis l [point
M in (a)].
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(a)

(b)

The following are a few basic properties of a glide reflection.

1.A glide reflection is completely determined by four points (two points and their respective
images). Given a point-image pair P and P under a glide reflection, we do not have enough
information to determine the glide reflection, but we do know that the axis l must pass
through the midpoint of the line segment PP . Given a second point-image pair Q and Q , we
can determine the axis of the re- flection: It is the line passing through the points M
(midpoint of the line segment PP ) and N (midpoint of the line segment QQ ), as shown in
(a). Once we find the axis of reflection l, we can find the image of one of the points—say P
—under the reflection. This gives the intermediate point P*, and the vector that moves P to
P* is the vector of translation v, as shown in (b). [In the event that the midpoints of PP and
QQ are the same point M, as shown in (c), we can still find the axis l by drawing a line
perpendicular to the line PQ passing through the common midpoint M.]

Q
P

P

l

v

P*

l
M

N
P

P

(a)

(b)
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(c)
2.A glide reflection has no fixed points. A fixed point of a glide reflection would have to be
a point that ends up exactly where it started after it is first translated and then reflected. This
cannot happen because the translation moves every point and the reflection cannot undo the
action of the translation.
3. A glide reflection is an improper rigid motion. A glide reflection is a combination of a
proper rigid motion (the translation) and an improper rigid motion (the reflection). Since the
translation preserves left-right and clockwise-counterclockwise orientations but the reflection
reverses them, the net result under a glide reflection is that orientations are reversed.
4.A glide reflection followed by the same glide reflection in the opposite direction is the
identity. To be more precise, if we move an object under a glide reflection with vector of
translation v and axis of reflection l and then follow it with an- other glide reflection with
vector of translation and axis of reflection still l, we get the identity motion. It is as if the
object was not moved at all.

4.6 Symmetries
With an understanding of the four basic rigid motions and their properties, we can now look
at the concept of symmetry in a much more precise way. A good definition of symmetry is
A symmetry of an object is a rigid motion that moves the object back onto itself.
Since there are only four basic kinds of rigid motions of two-dimensional objects in twodimensional space, there are also only four possible types of symmetries:
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• reflection symmetries
• rotation symmetries
• translation symmetries
• glide reflection symmetries
EXAMPLE 5.5 The symmetries of a square
What are the possible rigid motions that move the square in (a) back onto itself? First, there
are reflection symmetries. For example, if we use the line l1 in (b) as the axis of reflection,
the square falls back into itself with points A and B interchanging places and C and D
interchanging places. It is not hard to think of three other reflection symmetries, with axes l2,
l3, and l4 as shown in (b). Are there any other types of symmetries? Yes—the square has
rotation symmetries as well. Using the center of the square O as the rotocenter, we can
rotate the square by an angle of 90°. This moves the upper-left corner A to the upper-right
corner B, B to the lower-right corner C, C to the lower-left corner D, and D to the upper-right
corner A. Likewise, rotations with rotocenter O and angles of 180°, 270°, and 360°,
respectively, are also symmetries of the square. Notice that the 360° rotation is just the
identity.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(a) The original square
(b) Reflection symmetries (axes l1, l2, l3, and l4)
(c) Rotation symmetries (rotocenter O and angles of 90°, 180°, 270°, and 360°, respectively).
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EXAMPLE 5.6 The symmetries of a propeller
Let’s now consider the symmetries of the shape shown below in —a two- dimensional
version of a boat propeller (or a ceiling fan if you prefer) with four blades. Once again, we
have a shape with four reflection symmetries [the axes of reflection are l1, l2, l3, and l4 as
shown in (a)] and four rotation symmetries [with rotocenter located at the center of the
propeller and angles of 90°, 180°, 270°, and 360°, respectively, as shown in (b)]. And, just
as with the square, there are no other possible symmetries.

(a)

(b)

An important lesson lurks behind Examples 5.5 and 5.6: Two different- looking
objects can have exactly the same set of symmetries. A good way to think about
this is that the square and the propeller, while certainly different objects, are
members of the same “symmetry family” and carry exactly the same symmetry
genes. Formally, we will say that two objects or shapes are of the same symmetry
type if they have exactly the same set of symmetries.

4.7 5.7 Patterns
We have yet to see examples of shapes having translation or glide reflection symmetry. If we
think of objects as being finite, translation symmetry is impossible: A slide will always move
the object to a new position different from its original position! But if we broaden our
horizons and consider infinite “objects,” translation and glide reflection symmetries are
indeed possible.
We will formally define a pattern as an infinite “object” consisting of an infinitely
repeating basic design called the motif of the pattern. The reason we have “object” in
quotation marks is that a pattern is really an abstraction—in the real world there are no
infinite objects as such, although the idea of an infinitely repeating motif is familiar to us
from such everyday objects as pottery, textiles, and tile designs.
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Just like finite shapes, patterns can be classified by their symmetries. The classification of patterns according to their symmetry type is of fundamental importance
in the study of molecular and crystal organization in chemistry, so it is not surprising
that some of the first people to investigate the symmetry types of patterns were
crystallographers. Archaeologists and anthropologists have also found that analyzing the symmetry types used by a particular culture in their textiles and pottery helps
them gain a better understanding of that culture.
We will briefly discuss the symmetry types of border and wallpaper patterns.
BORDER PATTERNS
Border patterns (also called linear patterns) are patterns in which a basic motif repeat itself indefinitely in a single direction, as in a decorative fabric, a ribbon, or a
ceramic pot.
The most common direction in a border pattern (what we will call the direction of the
pattern) is horizontal, but in general a border pattern can be in any direction (vertical,
slanted 45°, etc.). Here are some examples of horizontal border patterns.

(a)

(b)

89

(c)

(a) African textile patterns
(b) ribbon with Navajo pattern
(c) Hopi Pueblo pot
What kinds of symmetries are possible in a border pattern?

The identity: Everything has identity symmetry.
Translation: By definition all border patterns have translation symmetry.

Horizontal reflection: Some border patterns have it, some don’t. There is only one possible
horizontal axis of reflection, and it must run through the middle of the pattern.
…

…

Vertical reflection: Some border patterns have it, some don’t. Vertical axes of re- flection
(i.e., axes perpendicular to the direction of the pattern) can run through the middle of a motif
or between two motifs.
Half-turn: Some border patterns have it, some don’t. Rotocenters can be located at the center
of a motif or between two motifs [Fig. 31(b)].
Glide reflection: Some border patterns have it, some don’t. Neither the reflection nor the
glide can be symmetries on their own. The length of the glide is half that of the basic
translation. The axis of the reflection runs through the middle of the pattern [Figs. 32(b) and
(c)].
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WALLPAPER PATTERNS
Wallpaper patterns are patterns that cover the plane by repeating a motif indefinitely along
two or more nonparallel directions. Typical examples of such patterns can be found in
wallpaper (of course), carpets, and textiles.
With wallpaper patterns things get a bit more complicated, so we will skip the details. The
possible symmetries of a wallpaper pattern are as follows:

The possible symmetries of a wallpaper pattern are as follows:
Translations. Every wallpaper pattern has translation symmetry in at least two different
(nonparallel) directions
Reflections. A wallpaper pattern can have (a) no reflections, (b)reflections in only one
direction, (c) reflections in two nonparallel directions, (d) reflections in three nonparallel
directions, (e) reflections in four nonparallel directions, and (f) reflections in six nonparallel
directions. There are no other possibilities.
Rotations. In terms of rotation symmetries, a wallpaper pattern can have (a) the identity
only, (b) two rotations (identity and 180°), (c) three rotations (identity, 120°, and 240°), (d)
four rotations (identity, 90°, 180°, and 270°), and (e) six
rotations (identity, 60°, 120°, 180°, 240°, and 300°). There are no other possibilities. (Once
again, note that a wallpaper pattern cannot have just five different rotations.)
Glide reflections. A wallpaper pattern can have (a) no glide reflections, (b) glide reflections
in only one direction, (c) glide reflections in two nonparallel directions, (d) glide reflections
in three nonparallel directions, (e) glide reflections in four nonparallel directions, and (f)
glide reflections in six nonparallel directions. There are no other possibilities.
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5 VIDEOS
1. THE MATHEMATICS OF ELECTIONS
1.1 The Basic Elements of an Election
https://youtu.be/CkjAQ9TqYfQ
https://youtu.be/sV5T_vgk44E
1.2 The Plurality Method
https://youtu.be/r-VmxJQFMq8
1.3 The Borda Count Method
https://youtu.be/hVG9jmA4FBU
1.4 The Plurality With Elimination Method
1.5 The Method of Pairwise Comparison
1.6 Fairness Criteria and Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
https://youtu.be/CuOLQT9P11I
1.7 Weighted Voting
https://youtu.be/Iaxblazgb1Y
https://youtu.be/5QBxgkpe8ks
https://youtu.be/sdWgGzetdWI
2. FAIR DIVISION
2.1 Fair Division Games
https://youtu.be/e7WO1lwW36s
2.2 The Divider-Chooser Method
https://youtu.be/qeWzUBvaf6c
2.3 The Lone-Divider Method
https://youtu.be/xOZUKsA8pOo
2.4 The Method of Sealed Bids
https://youtu.be/AmkPL2GRewQ
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3. FINANCIAL MATHEMATICS
3.1 Percentages
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1p9o6ymteI
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUJ-4oD9Oe8
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SphqHJVVMak
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LkTYkHbUiU4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cApv0GeF2XM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wsBhmrmumJo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1GTPRROi1tE
3.2 Simple Interest
https://youtu.be/r3-lyBGlJ98
https://youtu.be/BJ7TZo-1tSY
https://youtu.be/7qI4D5zSphg
https://youtu.be/9TPRWfKkhuc
3.3 Compound Interest
https://youtu.be/XgVnygbLnJw
https://youtu.be/r8Ki3FcYwEY
https://youtu.be/84x_IZCVXYM
https://youtu.be/SFsyTvXdbZg
https://youtu.be/dW0L68jbkcA
4. SHAPE AND FORMS
4.1 Rigid Motions
4.2 Reflections
4.3 Rotations
4.4 Translations
4.5 Glide Reflections
4.6 Symmetries
4.7 Patterns
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